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ABSTRACT
The relationship between economic deprivation and violent crime has been
extensively studied in the field of criminology, yet little is known about the impact of
recent macroeconomic and social policy changes on the relationship between child
poverty and youth violence trends. The current study aims to fill this gap in the literature
by assessing whether the macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies that
contributed to child poverty trends during the 1990s and early 2000s also contributed to
youth violent victimization trends variously disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family
structure. Also, the changing effects of poverty on youth’s violence risks were assessed to
determine the potential impact of welfare reform on the individual-level relationship
between poverty and violence.
For the overwhelming majority of youth, findings suggest that recent changes in
macroeconomic conditions and federal welfare policies did not influence trends in violent
victimization. However, significant impacts were found for certain groups of youth, most
notably those in female-headed families. Also, results from the micro-level analysis
revealed that the ‘female-headed family’ variable fully mediated the relationship between
poverty and youth’s violence risks both before and after the passage of welfare reform-the sum of the evidence suggesting that family structure is a key contingency in the
poverty-violence relationship. Other noteworthy findings include substantive differences
in the poverty-violence relationships of non-Hispanic and Hispanic youth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Multidisciplinary research has widely documented the detriments of economic
deprivation for child and adolescent well-being; it has been linked to a number of family
and child outcomes that adversely affect youth welfare and adjustment including
inadequate parenting (e.g. Grant et al., 2003), poor family functioning (e.g. Bradley et al.,
2001), cognitive and academic deficits (e.g. Sirin, 2005), emotional and behavioral
problems (e.g. Felner, 1995), and poor physical health (e.g. Brooks-Gunn & Duncan,
1997). In addition, criminologists have established numerous theoretical and empirical
connections between economic deprivation and youth crime via family, community, and
social processes that affect the socialization and regulation of youth behavior.
Despite a vast body of knowledge on the effects of economic deprivation on
youth, there is still much to learn about this relationship. Past research has paid little
attention to the effects of larger economic and social policy changes on youth violence
trends, and even less is known about these effects on youth sub-groups such as racial and
ethnic minorities, married couple and female-headed family members, etc. This research
will utilize the wealth of demographic and victimization data available in the National
Crime Victimization Survey to address these specific issues. Moreover, this research will
employ the use of repeated multivariate models to assess the independent effects of
economic deprivation, race and ethnicity, and family structure on youths’- violent
victimization risks over the years, thus filling an important gap in the youth victimization
literature.
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An important first step towards fulfilling these research goals is selecting an
appropriate indicator of youth economic deprivation. Children under 18 are obviously
limited in their ability to work and earn income and as a result, they depend
predominately on their families for financial support (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997).
Therefore, family income-based measures such as the official definition of poverty are
particularly relevant to youth economic well-being. As determined by the Census Bureau,
the poverty status of children is based on the total cash income of the family unit, which
differs from the household unit in that it only includes those persons within the household
that are related by birth, marriage, or adoption (Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 2006). If the
total family income before taxes is less than the designated poverty threshold for their
family size and composition, the family and all of its members is considered to be poor;
the proportion of 0 to 18 years olds in poverty is represented by the official child poverty
rate.
An additional advantage of the child poverty rate for the purposes of this research
is its relationship with macroeconomic conditions. As measured by the unemployment
rate, for example, the state of the economy is an important determinant of child poverty
rates (Nichols, 2006). More importantly, there has been a close historical association
between changes in the unemployment and child poverty rate that may have important
implications for youth violence trends. Though prior research overwhelmingly refutes a
relationship between changes in the economy and violence trends, there is evidence that
child poverty and youth violence trends are significantly associated (Messner,
Raffalovich, & McMillan, 2001). It stands to reason, therefore, that the macroeconomic
conditions that affect child poverty rates also affect youth violence. The child poverty
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trends that occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s offer a unique opportunity to
confirm this supposition.
Between 1993 and 2004, child poverty rates followed two distinct trends: a steady
and significant decline from 1993 to 2000 and a modest but steady increase from 2001 to
2004 (Nichols, 2006). As important as these trends, however, were the economic and
social policy changes that contributed to them. The 1990s were marked predominately by
the longest economic expansion of the post-World War II United States. This
unprecedented expansion led to significant improvements in the job market for lowskilled, less-educated workers and the first sustained increase in their real wage in over
thirty years (Jargowsky, 2003). These economic developments contributed to substantial
reductions in poverty for children and families, but markedly so for minorities and
female-headed families who are more likely to occupy the bottom of the job market.
If the economic expansion contributed to reductions in child poverty, economic
and social policy developments such as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions
and the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 also served as important stimuli. Enacted in 1975, the EITC
provided refundable tax credits and wage supplements to low-income working families
and the expansions in 1993 and 2000 were the largest in the program’s history
(Gunderson & Ziliak, 2004). Prior research has identified the EITC as a major impetus
for the growth in maternal employment from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (Meyer &
Rosenbaum, 2001).
PRWORA also had significant implications for maternal employment. This
legislation introduced major reforms to the federal welfare system which included
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mandatory work requirements, permanent time limits, sanctions for noncompliance, and
replacement of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program with block grants
to states entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (Greenberg et al., 2002).
Collectively, these policies contributed to increased work efforts among welfare
recipients and low-income single mothers, but more importantly the reductions in child
poverty accelerated in the wake of these reforms.
The economy entered a recession in 2001 that hit all families and demographic
groups (Langdon, McMenamin, & Krolik, 2002). As the economy weakened, the
sustained reductions in child poverty that occurred over the previous decade began to
stall and rates increased modestly throughout 2004. Although the recession affected all
groups of people, the gains in poverty for black children and female-headed families were
more than three times larger than their counterparts, which suggest that the weakening of
the economy had the greatest impact on the most disadvantaged groups.
What is the significance of these developments for youth violence? The violent
crime trends that occurred in the 1990s may offer some clue. The economic expansion
coincided with substantial reductions in violent crime, particularly among youth. This
decline in youth violence was particularly noteworthy because it was an unexpected
departure from the sharp increases that occurred over the previous decade (Butts &
Travis, 2002). At first glance, these trends share similarities that are suggestive of a
causal relationship; in addition to the fact that the crime decline occurred amidst an
unprecedented expansion of the U.S. economy, both trends seem to have pronounced
benefits for youth. But despite these commonalities, empirical support for a relationship
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between the economic expansion and concomitant reductions in youth violent crime is
generally lacking.
The lack of empirical support for a relationship between macroeconomic
conditions and youth violent crime does not warrant the dismissal of a possible
relationship, however. The economy-crime relationship is complex and it is possible that
it cannot be understood in terms of a direct causal connection. Instead it may be the case
that the economic state affects violent crime through its association with other factors
such as the child poverty rate. Research has already uncovered a significant association
between child poverty and youth violence trends (Messner et al., 2001), but has failed to
consider how macroeconomic conditions and social policy changes influence this
relationship. The state of the economy in the 1990s and early 2000s contributed to
distinct trends in child poverty and by assessing the impact of these trends on youth
violence rates, this research aims to identify the larger influence of the economic state on
changes in youth violence.
The economic expansion was also characterized by pronounced reductions in
poverty for minority youth and female-headed families, the former being consistent with
past patterns in child poverty trends. This research will examine the relationship between
disaggregated child poverty and youth violent victimization trends to determine how
changes in the economy influence violence among sub-groups such as racial and ethnic
minorities. Because researchers have relied heavily on data sources such as the Uniform
Crime Reports to study racial patterns in violent crime trends, much of our knowledge is
based on the differences between blacks and whites. By utilizing the race and Hispanic
origin variables available in the NCVS, this research will contribute to the understanding
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of how Hispanic youth violence has changed in recent decades and how those changes
are related to child poverty trends.
Also contributing to the trends in child poverty were the significant changes to the
nation’s welfare system. Prior research has extensively examined the effects of welfare
reform on children’s academic achievement, emotional and behavioral adjustment, and
physical health, but comparatively less is known about the effects of welfare reform on
adolescents. By assessing post-reform relationships between child poverty and youth
violence trends, this research will contribute to the understanding of how welfare reform
may have affected violence among youth--an aspect of child well-being that has been
overlooked in the welfare reform literature.
Because researchers failed predominately to anticipate the effects of welfare
reform and maternal employment on adolescent well-being, it was somewhat surprising
that several evaluations of welfare-to-work programs found negative impacts on youth
that included smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, and delinquency (Gennetian et al., 2002).
The avenues through which maternal employment may harm adolescents are largely
unknown, but researchers have advanced a number of hypotheses including decreased
parental monitoring and adolescents’ increased household responsibilities. Adolescents
who assume adult responsibilities in the home may feel that they have license to engage
in adult behaviors, particularly when they live in high-risk setting such as poor families
(Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow, 2001). Equally important as the relationship between child
poverty and youth violence trends is the understanding of how poverty impacted youth’s
risk for violent victimization before and after welfare reform.
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Welfare caseloads declined dramatically in the early post-reform era. In the three
years following the implementation of TANF, the number of recipients declined by
almost half and in 2000 nearly one-fifth of the closed cases were closed due to
employment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). However, these
figures may lead to specious conclusions about the success of welfare reform. Many
states adopted a work-first approach to PRWORA’s mandates and emphasized quick
entry into the labor force over human capital development. As a consequence, many
recipients transitioned into low-skilled, low-paying jobs that offered minimal benefits and
job security, and often remained poor despite meeting the mandatory work requirements
(e.g. Corcoran, 2000). Many of these low-income working families continued to face
significant financial struggles and remained vulnerable to repeated welfare use.
These trends have obvious implications for youth. Evidence from the National
Survey of American Families (NSAF) suggests that in the wake of welfare reform,
parental aggravation more than tripled among transitioning recipients with young
children (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006). Parental stress can invoke family conflict, strained
parent-child relationships, and harsh or inconsistent discipline, which in turn may lead to
a host of problem behaviors among youth. Parents with adolescent children did not
experience increased aggravation on the other hand, which may be due to the fact that
older children were able to ease the welfare-to-work transition by assuming more of the
household and family responsibilities. Although this line of reasoning is speculative, it
would explain why many adolescents reacted adversely to their parent’s participation in
welfare-to-work programs (Gennetian et al., 2002).
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If this supposition is correct, the trends in the proportion of youth in working poor
families may offer some insights into their experiences with family poverty. Though
child poverty rates declined throughout most of the 1990s and accelerated in the postTANF era, there were significant increases in the proportion of children in working poor
families. By 2000, more than three-fourths of all poor children and roughly 80 percent of
poor Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children lived in low-income working families
(Child Trends, no date). These proportions declined considerably over the early half of
the 2000s, possibly as low-income working parents accumulated the necessary skills and
work experience to secure better paying jobs.
Poverty has major consequences for parents and children in low-income working
families (Stanzyck, 2009). These consequences may even be exacerbated for adolescents
who might be expected to shoulder additional family and household responsibilities in the
absence of their parents. Through its contribution to the growing proportion of youth in
working poor families, the work requirements enacted by welfare reform may have
exacerbated the consequences of poverty for various aspects of child well-being. This
research will explore the possibility that welfare reform exacerbated the consequences of
poverty for youth’s violence risks and that these heightened consequences diminished
over time. This exploration will also achieve the larger objective of determining the
independent effects of poverty on youth’s risk for violence over time and the extent to
which this relationship has changed.
Again, there is a complex relationship between crime and the economy, and there
is still a lot that criminologists do not understand about the effects of changing economic
conditions on youth violence rates. One way to make sense of this relationship is to
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examine the association between child poverty and youth violence rates. Given the
significant relationship between the two, it stands to reason that the same economic
forces that influence child poverty rates also influence youth violence. In the same sense,
social policy changes such as the 1996 welfare reforms should also influence youth
violence through its influence on child poverty. Based on knowledge of the social policy
and economic climate of the 1990s and early 2000s and the response of child poverty
rates to these developments, this research seeks to make important deductions about the
effects of these economic changes and policy reforms on youth violence trends in recent
decades.
This line of research is important for several reasons. First, the social and
economic policies that impact child poverty rates most likely impact youth violence but
yet there is a general disconnect in the literature on the effects of economic and social
welfare policies such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and AFDC/TANF on youth
violence rates. Previous research has established both direct and indirect links between
welfare assistance levels and adult homicide rates in U.S. cities (e.g. DeFronzo, 1997)
and cross-national relationships between levels of welfare spending and child homicide
rates (e.g. Briggs & Cutright, 1994; Fiala & LaFree, 1988). However, researchers have
failed to consider how social policy might affect youth violence rates through its impact
on factors such as the child poverty rate.
Understanding this relationship will help policymakers and researchers to better
anticipate the effects of economic and social policy changes on child poverty and youth
violence, and hence allocate the appropriate resources toward prevention. Welfare reform
proponents believed that mandatory work requirements would serve to establish working
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parents as positive role models for adolescents preparing to enter the workforce, but they
did not anticipate the potential consequences for youth in working families; this oversight
was due largely to the fact that the body of knowledge on the effects of welfare reform on
youth was based predominately on young children (e.g. Gennetian et al., 2002). Since the
passage of welfare reform, significant strides have been made in this area of research but
there are still important limitations. As welfare policies continue to evolve and change, it
is particularly important to understand how future revisions might affect violence among
youth.
Second, this research may inform new ways to target anti-poverty initiatives
toward the prevention of youth violence. Violence prevention programs have
encompassed a number of peer, family, school, community, and faith based initiatives
over the years but if changes in the child poverty rate are indeed correlated with youth
violence trends, it is plausible that policies designed to alleviate poverty will also impact
youth violence. Often times, initiatives that target family poverty have parents with
young children as a priority and are commonly designed to promote health and nutrition,
school readiness, effective parenting, and healthy child development. However, including
protective measures for older children may go a long way toward preventing youth
violence and other problem behaviors. Although the explicit goals of PRWORA did not
include youth violence prevention, for example, including measures such as funding for
after-school programs, flexible work requirements for parents with older children, and
parent education programs geared toward the specific needs of adolescents could have
minimized some of the harmful consequences experienced by youth (Brooks et al.,
2001)--many of which were correlated with youth violence.
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Last, this research is important because it can potentially aid in predicting the
effects of future economic changes on youth violence trends. Though forecasting crime
and economic trends is a difficult task to say the least, understanding the effects of the
economic state on child poverty will in turn help researchers to anticipate the response of
youth violence rates to concurring economic conditions. For instance, a downturn in the
economy will most likely lead to an increase in unemployment and child poverty rates
(see Figure 2.1, p. 37), the latter of which is particularly pronounced for racial and ethnic
minorities. Given the positive association between child poverty and youth violence rates,
one would expect the increase in child poverty to be accompanied by a contemporaneous
increase in youth violence that is magnified for racial and ethnic minorities. Based on this
line of reasoning, then, one could plausibly expect youth violence to increase during
periods of economic downturn, but particularly so for minority youth.
Organization of Study
Pursuant to the research goals of this proposal, the remaining discussion will
proceed as follows: Chapter 2: Literature Review is a review of the relevant literature
pertaining to the relationship between economic deprivation and crime, beginning with a
general discussion of the relationship and proceeding with a more detailed review of the
literature as it relates to youth violence. This review will encompass common indicators
of economic deprivation, but special emphasis is placed on the child poverty rate for its
relevance to youth economic well-being.
After laying this foundation, the discussion will focus on the trends in child
poverty over recent decades, the economic and policy developments that contributed to
these trends as well as the significance of these developments for minorities and families,
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and the potential implications of these developments for youth violence trends. Finally,
the discussion will turn to the consequences of welfare reform for adolescents and
families, and the implications of the consequences for youths’ violence risks over time.
Chapter 3: Goals, Data, and Measures will outline the research goals for this
study and present an overview of NCVS methodology that includes a discussion of the
specific strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of this research. This chapter will also
detail the creation of key measures and present the characteristics of the sample along
these measures. Chapter 4: Macro-Level Analytic Strategy and Findings will discuss the
analytic strategy for the macro-level analysis and present the relevant findings while the
micro-level strategy and findings will be presented in Chapter 5: Micro-Level Analytic
Strategy and Findings. Finally, the results of all analyses will be summarized in Chapter
6: Summary and Conclusion, which will also address the research and policy implications
of the key findings and limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic deprivation has been theoretically linked to youth violence and
delinquency across a number of different paradigms including Social Disorganization
(Shaw and McKay, 1942), Institutional Anomie (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2000), Strain
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955), Subcultural (Wolfgang & Ferracutti, 1967;
Miller, 1958) Control (Hirschi, 1969), and Life-Course (Sampson & Laub, 1993)
theories. A general theme across these otherwise opposing models is that economic
deprivation indirectly influences youth crime by undermining the legitimacy of the law
and other conventional values, weakening social bonds, or impeding socialization and
other family processes such as discipline and supervision that serves to buffer youths
from criminal involvement. Moreover, economic deprivation is associated with financial
strains that may motivate youths to commit property and violent crimes as well as youth
crime rates in disadvantaged areas where social institutions are weaker sources of social
control.
As such, the empirical study of the deprivation-crime relationship has had a
longstanding tradition in criminology and has generated vigorous debate; much of the
contention has grown out of attempts to identify the key mechanisms through which
economic deprivation influences crime and criminality. However, the sum of the
empirical evidence suggests that there is an important relationship between these two
variables. Cross-sectional studies have consistently found significant associations
between various indicators of economic deprivation and violent crime rates in census
tracts (e.g. Hipp, 2007; Krivo & Peterson, 1996), neighborhoods (e.g. Hannon, 2005;
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Kubrin, 2003), cities (e.g. White, 1999; Kovandzic et al., 1998), counties (e.g. Lee et al.,
2003; Gould et al., 2002; Kelly, 2000), and states (e.g. Stolzenberg, 2006; Land et al.,
1990), and the preponderance of the empirical evidence suggests that the effects differ for
blacks and whites (e.g. Parker & McCall, 1999; LaFree & Drass, 1996; Harer &
Steffensmeier, 1992).
Less consistent is the empirical support for an individual-level relationship
between economic status and criminality. Past research has contested the validity of this
relationship (see Tittle et al., 1978 and Braithwaite, 1981 for opposing viewpoints), but
has evolved in its understanding of how structural conditions and characteristics affect
social processes in communities, schools, families, and other institutions that regulate and
influence individual behaviors (Currie, 1998).
Although there is an extensive body of literature on the economic deprivationcrime relationship, the majority of this research pertains to adult violence. Comparatively
less is known about the effects of economic deprivation on youth violence. Researchers
often define youth as older adolescents (i.e. 16 to 19 year olds) or young adults (i.e. 18 to
24 year olds), though there are many exceptions. The following section is a brief review
of selected findings on the relationship between youth violent crime and four common
indicators of economic deprivation: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, and
concentrated disadvantage.
Economic Deprivation and Youth Crime
Poverty
Absolute deprivation refers to a lack of income to meet basic needs according to
some fixed standard and is commonly demarcated by the official poverty line, which
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defines the standard for minimum family income according to family size and
composition (Nichols, 2006). Poverty, and in particular chronic poverty, has detrimental
consequences for families and children that are often cumulative. Not only does poverty
cause economic strains such as the inability to pay bills and purchase basic necessities
such as food and clothing, it also deprives families of the resources and capacity to cope
with other stressful life events (Wadsworth et al., 2005). This compounded stress can lead
to problems such as parental depression and strained parent-child relationships, which in
turn has important ramifications for adolescent development and well-being. Poverty has
also been linked to adolescent outcomes through its association with other characteristics
of families and parents such as family structure, age, race and ethnicity, and educational
attainment (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, & Maritato, 1997). Therefore, the adversities faced
by poor families could be a function of economic stress or the fact that parents are most
likely to be single, young, minority, less educated and thus predisposed to a host of other
economic and social ills that also have negative impacts on youth.
Nonetheless, family poverty exposes youth to various individual, family, and
community level risk factors, including emotional and behavioral problems (McLoyd,
1998; Felner, 1995); poor academic performance (Sirin, 2005); exposure to marital and
family violence (Santiago & Wadsworth, 2009; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002); harsh, lax,
or inconsistent discipline (Grant et al., 2003; Bradley et al., 2001); poor parental
monitoring (Evans, 2004; Bradley et al., 2001), residence in areas of concentrated
poverty (Drake and Rank, 2009; Jargowsky, 2003) and exposure to lead and other
environmental toxins (Evans, 2004; Bernard and McGeehin, 2003) that have been
identified as risk factors for youth violence across multiple disciplines (Leiber et al.,
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2009; Barnes et al., 2006; Resnick et al., 2004; Hay, 2001; Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2001;
Herrenkohl et al., 2000; Lipsey & Derzon, 1998; Needleman et al., 1996; Sampson &
Laub, 1994; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986).
In one of the only studies to examine the effects of child poverty on youth
violence, Messner, Raffalovich, and McMillan (2001) also found that changes in the
child poverty rate are significantly associated with trends in juvenile homicide arrests of
black and white youth, but more importantly so for blacks. Similarly, Levitt and Lochner
(2001) found a significant association between child poverty and juvenile homicide
trends in Chicago census tracts, but concluded that the changes in child poverty
accounted for less than ten percent of the increase in juvenile homicides from 1980 to
1990.
Unemployment
Because it impedes the ability to maintain certain income standards and supply
basic needs, unemployment is also a common indicator of absolute deprivation that is
theoretically connected to crime via two distinct mechanisms: criminal opportunity and
criminal motivation (see Cantor & Land, 1985). The former posits that unemployment
immediately reduces criminal opportunity by concentrating activities within primary
group locations such as the neighborhood and home, which is indicative of a negative,
contemporaneous effect. In addition to a guardianship effect, Messner et al. (2001)
propose that the concentration of activities around the neighborhood may also result in
intensive supervision of youths who tend to spend a lot of time around primary group
locations, which they coin the supervisory effect. According to the latter, the financial
distress caused by unemployment may serve as a motivation to commit crime, but this
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effect is not always immediate as newly unemployed persons often benefit from
unemployment compensation and family support, or may even find a new job. As support
dwindles and time without work increases, the motivation to engage in criminal activity
may increase.
It is also possible that the effects of unemployment may differ for adolescents
who have a limited ability to work and earn income. Whereas unemployment poses
significant problems for adults, it may be an advantage for adolescents who are expected
to devote the majority of their time to academics (Wright, Cullen, & Williams, 1997).
Not to mention, the majority of school-aged adolescents are not legally permitted to
work. There is some evidence that the effects of unemployment for youth are different
from the hypothesized effects for adults. For instance, Messner et al. (2001) found
negative, lagged effects of unemployment on youth homicide arrest trends, which is
contradictory to both criminal opportunity and criminal motivation effects.
Though joblessness is qualitatively different from unemployment, Krivo and
Peterson reached similar conclusions in their analysis of labor market conditions and
neighborhood violent crime arrests among three age groups: teenagers (15 to 19), young
adults (20 to 24), and older adults (25 and older). In addition to joblessness, the
percentage of the population employed in the lowest paying occupations was
significantly related to violent crime arrests among young adults while the former
influenced arrests among older adults. For adolescents, however, neither the quantity nor
quality of available jobs affected violent crime arrests, which is consistent with life
course perspectives that assign limited importance to employment as a conventional bond
for youth vis-à-vis family and school (e.g. Sampson & Laub, 1993; Thornberry, 1987).
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Moreover, there is empirical evidence that employment may even have negative
consequences for youth.
Some researchers have found that adolescents employed during the school year,
and in particular those who work more than 20 hours a week, are at greater risk for
delinquency and problem behaviors than their counterparts (e.g. Heimer, 1995; Agnew,
1986), and that this relationship is most salient for males at high risk for delinquency
involvement (Wright et al., 1997). There is also evidence of a positive association
between the amount of economic resources available to youth from work or other sources
and delinquent behavior (Heimer, 1995; Agnew, 1986; Cullen et al., 1985), particularly
when youth are already predisposed to delinquency (Agnew, 1990). Intense work efforts
and access to economic resources may serve to detach youth from school and parental
support, both of which play a key role in youth social control.
But while research has reported significant associations between work intensity
and delinquency, the findings are equivocal. At issue is whether the relationship reflects
the harmful nature of youth employment or pre-existing differences between intensive
and non-intensive workers. Attempting to address this concern, Paternoster et al. (2003)
estimated random and fixed effects models to evaluate the youth employmentdelinquency relationship net of the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Previous
research generally controlled for selection effects with lagged delinquency and other
delinquency-related factors, which only captured the observed differences between
workers.
Consonant with this research, they found a significant association between intense
work during the academic year and delinquency that was appreciably reduced, but not
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eliminated by the introduction of various individual, peer, family, and school related
covariates. However, the relationship disappeared when random and fixed effects models
were estimated to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that the reported
relationship between work intensity and delinquency is biased by selection effects.
Similar conclusions have also been reached about the effects of youth employment on
academic performance (see Warren et al. 2000).
Economic Inequality
While absolute deprivation is determined on the basis of fixed income standards,
relative deprivation is based on the distribution of income and is commonly
operationalized as economic inequality, or the gap in income between the rich and poor.
Generally speaking, relative deprivation models presume that individuals assess their
social and economic standing in comparison to others and it is their frustration with
perceived inequalities or injustices that can potentially breed criminal behavior.
Structural inequalities can also influence macro-level crime rates, particularly in
extremely disadvantaged areas marked by routine violence and weak social controls.
Some researchers have attributed racial and ethnic differences in violent crime rates to
longstanding patterns of economic and racial residential inequality that have
disproportionately concentrated blacks in socially and economically isolated communities
(e.g. Massey, 1995).
Empirical support for an inequality-crime relationship is mixed. The seminal
study conducted by Blau and Blau (1982) found that total and racial inequality had
important effects on violent crime rates in 125 of the largest metropolitan areas in the
United States which tended to nullify the poverty effect. These findings were affirmed by
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few studies (e.g. Blau & Golden, 1986), but others have found only partial (e.g. Balkwell,
1990; Williams, 1984) or no support (e.g. Patterson, 1991; Messner & South, 1986). One
source of these discrepant findings is the differential effects of inequality on black and
white violent crime rates (Stolzenberg et al., 2006; Parker & McCall, 1999; Harer &
Steffensmeier, 1992; LaFree et al., 1992; Messner & Golden, 1992), though some
researchers have argued that selection of the appropriate reference group is an important
contingency of the inequality-crime relationship (e.g. LaFree & Drass, 1996; Harer &
Steffensmeier, 1992). It is suggested that individuals gauge their economic standing by
comparing themselves to those of similar race, educational background, etc.
Hence, intra-racial inequality should have particular utility for predicting crime rates
disaggregated by race and ethnicity.
There are also reasons to suspect that intraracial inequality is an important
predictor of youth violent crime rates. First, the conception of social structure and
economic inequality is a developmental process. In comparison to younger children,
adolescents have an “increased capacity to consider the perspectives of different groups
(or roles) within society, with the recognition that these perspectives are systematically
coordinated through convention or social structure” (Leahy, 1983, p. 112), but they also
tend to be egocentric, or more concerned with self than society. So despite increased
social awareness, adolescents tend to be most concerned with themselves and others in
their immediate social environment (i.e. peers, neighbors, schoolmates, etc.). As such,
measures of intraracial inequality should prove a more relevant indicator of perceived
deprivation among youth and hence a better predictor of violent crime rates.
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Messner et al. (2001) provide some support for these expectations in their
assessment of the relationship between economic deprivation and youth homicide arrest
trends. Their indicator of interracial inequality, the ratio of white to black median family
income, was found to be unrelated to arrest trends, but changes in various indicators of
intraracial inequality significantly predicted homicide arrest trends for both black and
white youth. The income share of the top 5% of households had a lagged effect on white
homicide arrests and a contemporaneous effect on blacks. However, changes in the child
poverty rate, which is based on direct measurements of family income, emerged as the
most significant and robust predictor of black and white youth homicide arrest trends.
This finding lends credence to the assumption that youth violent crime rates are better
predicted by more proximate indicators of deprivation.
Past research conducted by Shihadeh and Steffensmeier (1994) also found that
income inequality had only trivial direct effects on black youth violence while racial
inequality failed to exert any significant effect either directly or indirectly. However,
intraracial inequality had significant and substantial effects on black youth violence that
were mediated by family disruption.
Concentrated Disadvantage
Neighborhood crime rates have long been associated with endemic structural
characteristics such as concentrated disadvantage, particularly in urban areas. Commonly
measured as a summary index of the unemployment and poverty rate and the proportion
of blacks, welfare recipients, and female-headed households in the population,
concentrated disadvantage has been theoretically linked to crime via collective efficacy
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), systems of social relationships (Bursik &
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Grasmick, 1993), and cultural adaptations that subvert community social organization
and legitimate the use of violence (e.g. Anderson, 1999).
Research has also established an important empirical connection between
concentrated disadvantage and youth violence. For instance, MacDonald and Gover
(2005) found a significant association between concentrated disadvantage, a summed
index of the proportion of poor, unemployed, black, and female householders in U.S.
cities, and youth-on-youth homicides. The growth in urban concentrated disadvantage,
along with rising divorce rates within cities, was also significantly associated with the
increase in youth homicides in the early 1990s.
In her analysis of the simultaneous effects of individual, family, and community
risk factors on youth’s risks for violent victimization, Lauritsen (2003) found
substantially higher risks for violence among youth in extremely disadvantaged
neighborhoods though community disadvantage appeared to be unrelated to violence
risks for most youth. One element of the disadvantage index, the percentage of femaleheaded households with children, consistently exerted a significant effect on total,
stranger, and non-stranger violent victimization risks net of other individual, family, and
community risk factors. To put these findings into perspective, however, the individual
and family risk factors that placed youth at the greatest risk for violent victimization was
time spent at home and length of current residency, both of which had negative effects.
Contextual studies have also identified various mechanisms through which
community disadvantage influence the risk for and perpetration of violence by individual
youth, which include the presence of traditional male role models (Parker and
Reckdenwald, 2008), exposure to criminogenic street contexts in the form of deviant peer
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association and exposure to serious violence (De Coster, Heimer, & Wittrock, 2006), and
street codes that condone violence (Stewart & Simons, 2006), though the latter was only
a partial mediator.
Racial differences in serious youth violence have also been attributed to the fact
that black youth are more likely to reside in disadvantaged communities than youth in
other racial groups (DeCoster et al., 2006), but while community disadvantage is key in
explaining the black-white disparity, other factors such as exposure to gang violence and
school attachment may better explain the disparity for Hispanic and Native American
youth (McNulty & Bellair, 2003).
To summarize, there is considerable evidence of an important association between
economic deprivation and youth crime. However, it is also apparent from the preceding
discussion that some special considerations must be observed when assessing this
relationship, particularly in a sample of school-aged adolescents. One such consideration
is the measurement of youth economic deprivation. Given their limited access to work
and income, many of the indicators commonly used to measure absolute deprivation
among adults have limited relevance for youths.
Measuring Youth Economic Deprivation
Because adolescents tend to be developmentally and physically oriented toward
self and the immediate social environment, it is likely that the most relevant indicator of
youth economic deprivation is one based on youth’s own economic well-being or that of
close social networks such as their family or household unit, the latter of which may
include cohabiters and other unrelated household members that contribute economic
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resources to the family, and same-race peer groups within the neighborhood or school
(Lopez Turley, 2003).
Again, researchers often use unemployment as an indicator of economic
deprivation because it limits access to income and basic material resources for daily
living. As an indicator of youth economic deprivation, however, its utility is hampered by
the fact that the majority of school-aged adolescents are restricted from participating in
the full-time civilian labor force. Moreover, the youngest segment of the civilian labor
force, 16 to 17 year olds, has seen decreases in school-year employment in recent years
and concurrent increases in the percentage unemployed--a trend that transcends the
demographic lines of gender, race and ethnicity (Morisi, 2008).
Contributing to these recent trends are declines in the real wage for teenage
workers and slow recovery of the teenage employment rate after the 2001 recession, but
the past twenty years have also witnessed an increase in the proportion of students
enrolled in and subject to advanced coursework and placement exams (Morisi, 2008). In
addition, an increasing number of states are requiring students to pass high school exit
exams as a condition of graduation. Currently, 26 of the 50 states have either
implemented or plan to implement mandatory exit exams by 2012, and the overwhelming
majority of these states initialize exams in tenth grade when students are at the cusp of
entering the labor force (Center for Educational Policy, 2009).
Other trends suggest a growing acknowledgement of the value of education for
future earnings. Over the past three decades or so, there has been a positive association
between educational attainment and earnings as well as an increase in the percentage of
young adults enrolling in degree-granting institutions (National Center for Educational
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Statistics, no date), although it is likely that other factors contributed to the latter trend
such as declining employment opportunities for low-skilled workers and greater
availability of student financial aid. These trends collectively suggest that working may
be a less attractive or viable option for school-aged adolescents who face more advanced
coursework and stricter educational requirements.
Income based measures of youth economic deprivation are also problematic for a
couple of reasons. First, working adolescents are generally employed in part-time, lowskill jobs that pay a low-wage, so the nature of youth employment and earnings is one
that inherently situates them at the bottom of the income distribution. Second, the income
that adolescents acquire from work or other sources is not typically allocated towards
family living expenses, and thus is not reflective of their access to income for important
material resources. The following excerpt from Steinberg (1996) illustrates this point:
Contrary to popular stereotype, working students are not mainly poor youngsters
who are working because their families need their earnings, but middle class
youth who are working for additional pocket money to spend on themselves.
National surveys show that almost none of the typical student worker’s earnings
goes toward family expenses or into a college savings accounts. Most of it goes
toward clothing, cars, stereo equipment and socializing (p. 167).
Referring to the findings from his own collaborative research, he goes on to state:
In our study, for example, close to 60 percent of the workers we surveyed said
they spent most or all of their earnings…on immediate personal expenses. Only
about 10 percent said they saved most or all of their earnings for college, and only
3 percent said they gave most or all of their earnings to the family (p. 168).
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Hence, adolescents tend to use their own economic resources to fund social activities and
fulfill material desires while most likely depending on family income to cover the costs
of housing, utilities, food, medical care, and educational resources, which makes family
income a better gauge of the material and economic well-being of youth.
Given the significance of family income for youth economic well being, the child
poverty rate seems a particularly relevant indicator of youth economic deprivation. The
official poverty measure defines the family as the economic unit for determining poverty
status, and children are considered to be poor if the total pre-tax cash income for their
family unit is less than the poverty threshold designated for their family size and
composition (Hoynes et al., 2006).
Its utility notwithstanding, the official poverty measure has been extensively
criticized over the years for its failure to account for the Earned Income Tax credit, inkind benefits from government assistance programs, state and federal tax deductions, and
other family or work related expenses that affect the amount of expendable income
available to families, and there is particular concern that these omissions may lead to
inflated child poverty rates as families with children are most likely to receive benefits
from means-tested government programs. While past research has confirmed that the
official measure does tend to overstate child poverty, there is also evidence that there are
no substantial differences in time-series patterns of official and experimental poverty
rates (Iceland et al., 2001; Short et al., 1999). Therefore, the official measure appears
capable of producing long-term trends in the poverty rate with some accuracy.
The proceeding discussion will focus on the distinct trends in child poverty that
occurred throughout the 1990s and the early half of the millennium, the economic and
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social climate in which these trends occurred, and the significance of these trends for
minorities and families. Following is an overview of the crime drop that also occurred in
the 1990s and suppositions about the relationship between child poverty and violent
crime trends. Finally, the impact of economic and social policy changes on this
relationship will be explored.
Trends in Child Poverty, 1993-2004
The Economic Expansion of the 1990s
According to Nichols (2006), two distinct trends in child poverty occurred
between 1993 and 2004: a stable and significant decline from 1993 to 2000 and a modest
but stable increase from 2001 to 2004. However, the significance of these trends cannot
be fully understood apart from the economic and social context in which they occurred.
Save a brief recession in the early part of the decade, the 1990s were marked by a period
of unprecedented economic growth that peaked in 2000 when the U. S. labor market
reached full employment (Freeman, 2001). More importantly, this economic expansion
spread to the lower end of the job market and contributed to the first sustained increase in
real wages for low-skilled workers in over thirty years (Jargowsky, 1999). This feature
set the economic expansion of the 1990s apart from the expansions of the previous
decade.
In addition to the economic expansion, the 1990s also witnessed a number of
social policy changes designed to encourage work among poor and female-headed
families--the populations at greatest risk for welfare dependency. One of these changes
was federal and state expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1993 and
2000 that were the most substantial expansions to the credit since its 1975 enactment

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.35
(Gunderson & Ziliak, 2004). The EITC provides refundable tax credits and wage
supplements to low income working families and has been identified as a major
contributor to the growth in maternal employment between the mid-1980s and 1996
(Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001).
The other change was the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which introduced major reforms to the
federal welfare system, the most significant being the replacement of the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with block grants to states entitled Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) to be effective July 1, 1997. Under TANF
guidelines, states were given broad discretion to design their own welfare program and
determine eligibility, but were prohibited from using federal funds to assist families for
more than five cumulative years and teenage parents not attending school or under adult
supervision. In addition, recipients were subject to mandatory work requirements and
possible sanctions for noncompliance and rule violations, including the reduction or
termination of all cash and food stamp benefits (Greenberg et al., 2002).
Collectively, these developments contributed to substantial improvements in the
job market, particularly among low-skilled, low-income workers. In turn, these job
market improvements played a major role in reducing child poverty, but most
prominently for black children whose parents are more likely to be situated at the bottom
of the job market (Nichols, 2006). While low-skilled workers benefit importantly during
periods of economic growth, they tend to experience more substantial growth in
unemployment during periods of economic recession, which in turn is associated with the
growth in child poverty rates.
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Historically, there has been a close association between indicators of
macroeconomic growth (e.g. GDP, unemployment rate) and poverty rates, but the
strength of the relationship has varied over time. National poverty rates declined
substantially during the robust economy of the 1960s, but fell at a much slower rate
relative to GDP growth during the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s (e.g. Blank et al.,
1993; Cutler et al., 1991), which caused researchers to question the poverty-reducing
effect of the ‘rising tide’. However, more recent research suggests that the weak
association between economic growth and poverty rates during the ‘70s and ‘80s was a
departure from historical trends and that the ‘typical’ association re-emerged during the
1990s (Freeman, 2001; Haveman & Schwabish, 1999).
Given the economic growth-poverty association and the acute sensitivity of
minorities to changing macroeconomic conditions, it is expected that periods of economic
expansion and declining child poverty is characterized by faster declines for minority
children, and in particular blacks. Figure 2.1 illustrates the long-term trends in economic
growth as measured by the unemployment rate and child poverty, revealing that
minorities consistently display greater sensitivity to upturns in the economy. During
periods of declining child poverty, the reduction for minority children is much more
pronounced than the reduction for all children. This trend is particularly apparent during
the economic expansion of the 1990s.
Between 1993 and 2000, the poverty rate for all children declined by nearly 7
percentage points while the rate for non-Hispanic white children declined by about 5
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points. In comparison, the respective declines for Hispanic and black children were
roughly 13 and 15 percentage points, which is consistent with Borjas’ contention that
minorities exhibit greater sensitivity to changing economic conditions. The poverty
reductions for minority children were also noteworthy because the height of the economic
boom (i.e. 2000) witnessed the lowest rate ever recorded for black children by the Census
Bureau and the lowest rate for Hispanic children since the early and late 1970s (Dalaker,
2001). Despite reaching a record low, however, the black child poverty rate in 2000 was
still about 15 percentage points higher than the rate for all children.
There have also been relatively few changes in the Hispanic child poverty rate
relative to the non-Hispanic white child poverty over the years (Nichols, 2006). Since the
early 1970s, the Hispanic child poverty rate has consistently been about three times the
rate of non-Hispanic white children, the only exception being the mid-1990s when the
gap in poverty was nearly fourfold. So despite the fact that the changes in child poverty
have been more pronounced for Hispanic children over the years, the rate has grown in
similar proportion to non-Hispanic white children.
In addition to the reductions in child poverty, the economic boom also contributed
to significant declines in family poverty. The poverty rate fell by about twenty-nine
percent for both female-headed and all families from 1993 to 2000, but the rate for
female-headed families fell by about 10 percentage points in comparison to a 4-point
reduction for all families and 2-point reduction for married couple families. Similar to
the black child poverty rate, the proportion of female-headed families in poverty also
dipped to a record low in 2000 while the rate for married couple families remained
unchanged from its historic low in 1999 (Dalaker, 2001).
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The nature of the reduction in family poverty was different from that of child
poverty in that it was not a steady decline. Between 1995 and 1996, there was a slight
increase in the proportion of female-headed and all families in poverty while remaining
stable for married couple families. However, all family groups experienced an
accelerated decline in poverty after 1997, which coincided roughly with the rise in real
wages for low-skilled workers and the implementation of the TANF program. In fact,
about 68 percent of the decline female-headed family poverty occurred during this time
period as well as nearly half of the decline for black children, three-fifths of the decline
for non-Hispanic white children, and three-fourths of the decline for Hispanic children.
The Recession and Economic Slowdown of the Early 2000s
The longest economic expansion of the post-war United States eventually gave
way to a brief recession in March 2001. Occurring on the heels of an unusually high
economic peak, however, this recession was not particularly severe in terms of the
employment decline. Excluding this past recession, Hall (2007:14) ranked the decline in
employment associated with the 2001 downturn as the sixth largest of all the post-war
recessions. Nonetheless, the labor market softened considerably for workers across all
racial and ethnic, family and earnings groups as well as for both teenagers and adults.
The economic downturn also affected both high- and low-skilled workers in a wide range
of occupations though sharp declines in computer and data processing services, personnel
services, and various manufacturing-related services stem from the steep downturn in the
manufacturing industry (Langdon, McMenamin, & Krolik, 2002). The unemployment
rate continued to increase throughout 2003 before decreasing negligibly in 2004.
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After an eight year decline, the child poverty rate also increased steadily from
2001 to 2004, although the increase was modest compared to the significant reductions of
the previous decade. During this time period, poverty increased by nearly 2 percentage
points for all children compared to an overall increase of roughly 4 percentage points for
black children and 1 percentage point for Hispanic and non-Hispanic white children,
although the latter trends differed somewhat from the trends for all children. So, while all
groups of children experienced only slight increases in poverty, black children appeared
to be most affected by the economic downturn. On the other hand, Hispanic children did
not appear to be particularly affected at all.
In addition to increases in child poverty, the economic downturn was also marked
by stable but modest growth in the poverty rate for all family groups. The poverty rate for
all families increased from 9.2 percent in 2001 to 10.2 percent in 2004, an increase of
roughly 11 percent. In comparison, the increase for married couple and female-headed
families was 0.6 and 1.9 percentage points respectively, the latter being more than three
times larger than the former. Table 2.1 summarizes the changes in child and family
poverty from 1993 to 2004.
The Crime Drop
In addition to important economic and social developments, the 1990s were also
marked by precipitous declines in youth violent crime. This crime drop was an
unexpected departure from the dramatic increase in violence that occurred from the mid
1980s to the early 1990s, much of which was due to the emergence of crack cocaine
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Table 2.1
Changes in Child and Family Poverty in the Current Population Survey, 1993-2004
Children by
Race/Ethnicity

1993

1997

2000

1993- 19972000 2000

2001

2004

20012004

Non-Hispanic white 13.6

11.4

9.1

-4.5

-2.3

9.5

10.5

+1.0

Black alone

46.1

37.2

31.2

-14.9

-6.0

30.2

33.7

+3.5

Hispanic

40.9

36.8

28.4

-12.5

-8.4

28.0

28.9

+0.9

All children

22.7

19.9

16.2

-6.5

-3.7

16.3

17.8

+1.5

1993

1997

2000

1993- 19972000 2000

2001

2004

20012004

Married couple

6.5

5.2

4.7

-1.8

-0.5

4.9

5.5

+0.6

Female-headed

35.6

31.6

25.4

-10.2

-6.2

26.4

28.3

+1.9

All families

12.3

8.7

-3.6

-1.6

9.2

10.2

+1.0

Family Group

10.3

Note: Differences reported in percentage points.
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markets in inner cities and the associated proliferation of guns. In fact, some researchers
suggest that the rise in homicides during this period was entirely in the use of handguns
by youth under the age of 25 (Travis & Waul, 2002). The number of juvenile arrests for
violent index offenses rose by more than 60 percent during the same time period and the
arrest rate peaked at an all-time high of 512.2 per 100,000 in 1994, which occurred at
roughly the same time that analysts were projecting an increase in the youth population of
more than 20 percent over the next two decades (Butts & Travis, 2002).
The dramatic rise in violent victimization and offending, coupled with the
projected growth in the juvenile population, launched youth violence to the forefront of
public concern. Dire predictions of a youth crime wave were cast and many states moved
toward the adoption of ‘get tough’ juvenile justice policies to punish serious young
offenders (Feld, 1998). Despite these ominous predictions, however, there was an abrupt
and substantial decline in violent crime in the mid-1990s that persisted throughout the
turn of the century. The crime decline occurred so unexpectedly that it was initially
dismissed as temporary or anomalous (Butts & Travis, 2002), but it would prove to be
important for several reasons. First, significant declines occurred across all of the major
crime categories, encompassing both violent and property crimes. Second, the crime
decline occurred across cities, suburbs, rural areas, and all regions of the country. Third,
the decline in violence spanned the categories of race, gender, and age, though juveniles
experienced the most salient declines (Levitt, 2004).
Between 1994 and 2000, violent crime arrests declined by about 34 percent for
juveniles, 18 percent for young adults, and 16 percent for older adults, but the reductions
are even more significant for murder, robbery, and aggravated assault. Murder arrests
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declined by 68 percent for juveniles, 39 percent for young adults, and 31 percent for older
adults. For robbery, the corresponding declines were 51 percent, 39 percent, and 31
percent while the declines in aggravated assault were 22 percent, 12 percent, and 10
percent. Whereas juveniles contributed to nearly one-third of the increase in violent crime
arrests between 1980 and 1994, their contribution to the 1994 to 2000 decline was about
58 percent (Butts & Travis, 2000).
Macroeconomic Conditions and Violent Crime
A number of explanations have been advanced for the crime drop of the 1990s
including demographic changes, tougher gun control laws, innovative policing strategies,
the decline of the crack cocaine market, and the economic expansion of the 1990s (Levitt,
2004). That the crime drop occurred at roughly the same time that the U.S. economy was
undergoing the longest expansion of the 20th Century would seem to suggest that the two
trends are associated, but the empirical evidence is equivocal. Econometric evidence
generally supports a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and crime
(Freeman, 2001), but this support is limited primarily to economically motivated crimes.
The basic premise of the economic model of crime is that individuals decide
whether to engage in crime or legitimate work by weighing factors such as their
probability of securing a job and earning potential in the legitimate job market with their
opportunity to commit crime, the potential economic return, and the risk of apprehension
(Freeman, 2001), obviously choosing the option that yields the greatest returns.
Macroeconomic shifts can influence crime trends by affecting the relative returns
associated with criminal involvement and legitimate work. Because most criminals are
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situated at the bottom of the job market, economic growth is most likely to affect crime
when it impacts low-skilled workers as was the case in the 1990s expansion.
The economic expansion drove unemployment below the natural rate in over 44
percent of metropolitan areas, but the wages of less-educated adult men remained largely
unchanged. In contrast, there were important gains in employment and earnings among
less educated young men, and in particular young black men (Freeman and Rodgers,
1999). Research conducted by Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2001) identified wages,
and to a lesser extent unemployment, of less-educated males as important determinants of
long-term economically motivated crime trends, but found that the declining
unemployment rate contributed more importantly to the crime drop of the 1990s than the
growth in wages. Other studies have found small but statistically significant effects of
state-level unemployment on property crime (e.g. Donohue & Levitt, 2001; Raphael &
Winter-Ebmer, 2001), but generally fail to find any effects for violent crime. These
negative findings are consistent with evidence that predominately suggests that there is
no direct association between economic growth and violent crime rates.
Though the preponderance of the evidence suggests that changes in the economy
are unrelated to violent crime trends, there are a few exceptions. For instance, Grogger
(2006) suggests that there is an association between the increase in wages for low-skilled
workers and the decline in violence in the 1990s, positing specifically that the wage
increase served to enhance the attractiveness of the legitimate job market for both active
and potential dealers seeking to leave the violent drug trade. The findings from Messner,
et al. (2001) also have important implications for the relationship between
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macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime, particularly in light of the historical
association between economic growth and child poverty rates.
Given the close association between economic growth and child poverty rates, it
is also possible that the changes in the economy that influence child poverty rates also
influence rates of youth violent victimization. However, previous research has not
addressed this possibility. Focusing exclusively on adolescents between the ages of 12
and 17, one of the primary goals of this analysis is to determine if there is an association
between child poverty and youth victimization trends from 1993 to 2004, and whether
larger economic conditions played a significant role. Given the differential effects of
macroeconomic conditions on minorities, it is necessary to assess child poverty and youth
violence trends disaggregated by race and ethnicity to gain meaningful insights into these
possible relationships.
All children experienced sustained declines in poverty during the economic
expansion but there were important racial and ethnic differences in the magnitude of the
decline. Although black, non-Hispanic white and Hispanic children experienced poverty
reductions of roughly one-third each, the largest overall reductions were experienced by
blacks and Hispanics. During weaker economic conditions, poverty rose modestly for all
children as well as for blacks, non-Hispanic whites, and Hispanics. However, black
children still experienced the largest overall growth in poverty. Did violence trends for
non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white, and Hispanic youth respond similarly to these
economic conditions? Did non-Hispanic black and Hispanic youth experience the largest
reductions in violent victimization during the economic expansion of the 1990s? Did nonHispanic black youth experience the largest overall growth in victimization during the
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weaker economic conditions of the early 2000s? Were youth violence trends for nonHispanic black, non-Hispanic white and Hispanic youth more closely associated with
overall poverty or group-specific poverty trends? These are some of the key questions
this research will address.
The trends in family poverty may also have consequences for youth violence.
Along with race and ethnicity, family structure is one of the most important predictors of
child poverty that is also consequential for other aspects of child well-being, including
violent victimization. All families experienced significant declines in poverty throughout
the 1990s, but the reduction for female-headed families was much more substantial than
the reduction for married couple and all families. The growth in family poverty during
the economic downturn was trivial, but the increase for female-headed families was still
about three times larger than that for married couple families. This research will also
consider whether the trends in family poverty had any significance for youth violent
victimization trends by addressing the following questions: Did youth in female-headed
families experience the largest reductions in violent victimization during the economic
expansion? Did they also experience the most substantial growth in victimization in the
early 2000s?
The passage of welfare reform was one of the most important social policy
developments of the 1990s, and one of the implicit goals of the reform was to enhance
the social and economic well-being of disadvantaged children through the promotion of
work and marriage. Moreover, the 1996 law required states to submit an annual statement
of their child poverty rate to the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and
based on child poverty data from the Census Bureau, submit a corrective action plan if it
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increased by more than five percent as a result of the TANF program. Upon approval the
plan was to be implemented until the child poverty rate was sufficiently reduced (P.L.
104-193, Title I, Sec. 103). After the implementation of the TANF program, there was a
marked acceleration in child poverty rates.
Given these efforts to regulate child poverty and the timing of the accelerated
decline, welfare reform was a likely contributor. In the wake of welfare reform, nearly
half of the decline in black child poverty occurred as well as the bulk of the decline for
non-Hispanic white and Hispanic children. Another objective of this analysis is to
determine whether the marked reduction in poverty in the late 1990s had any significance
for youth violence trends by addressing the following questions: Was there also a marked
acceleration in youth violence during the early post reform period (i.e. 1997-2000)? Did
the bulk of the decline in violence occur for non-Hispanic white and Hispanic youth after
the implementation of the TANF program? Were there any significant differences in the
poverty-youth violence association in the early post-reform and entire expansion period?
However, affirmative findings should not be interpreted as evidence that welfare
reform caused the marked reduction in poverty, but that it most likely played an
important supportive role. Instead the objective is to generally determine if the postreform period had any particular significance for the decline in youth violent
victimization, an aspect of child well-being that has been largely ignored in the welfare
reform literature.
Poverty and the Risk for Violence
Thus far the discussion has centered on the macro-level relationship between
economic deprivation and youth crime, but it is equally important to consider whether the
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social developments of the 1990s influenced youth’s risks for violent victimization.
Previous research has established a connection between one’s economic status and
violence risks, but has failed to consider whether the strength of this relationship has
varied over time. Did the social developments of the 1990s exacerbate the consequences
of poverty for youth violent victimization? There is at least some experimental evidence
that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare reform had adverse effects on
adolescents whose mother participated in welfare-to-work programs, including poor
academic performance as well as school suspension and expulsion (Gennetian et al.,
2002).
Though welfare caseloads declined dramatically and employment among single
mother increased in the early post-reform years, evidence from the National Survey of
American Families (NSAF) suggests that many welfare leavers worked low-skilled, lowwage jobs that offered little to no benefits or job security. As a result, many leavers
continued to face significant financial and material hardships despite meeting the
mandated work requirements, including difficulties paying for basic needs such as
housing and food (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; see also Corcoran et al., 2000). Moreover,
parental aggravation more than tripled among new welfare leavers with young children
between 1997 and 2002, which may very well reflect stress associated with the welfareto-work transition (Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006). In turn, financial stress and parental
aggravation can obviously strain family and parent-child relationships with harmful
consequences for youth.
As such, researchers have cited strained parent-child relationships along with
inadequate supervision and adolescents’ increased responsibilities in the home as possible
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explanations for the negative adolescent outcomes (Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow, 2001). The
experimental evidence suggests that adolescents were most likely to exhibit problem
behaviors if younger siblings were present in the home, presumably because they
assumed many of the household and child care responsibilities (Gennetia et al., 2002).
Research on adolescents suggests that the assumption of adult roles and responsibilities
may encourage defiance towards authority figures such as parents and teachers,
engagement in adult behaviors such as drinking, smoking, and early sexual behavior, and
interfere with schoolwork, particularly among adolescents in high-risk settings such as
poor families and communities (Brooks et al., 2001).
Pinpointing the source of the negative adolescent outcomes is beyond the scope of
this research, but the preceding discussion was meant to illustrate some of the harmful
consequences of welfare reform for adolescents in low-income working families. Instead,
the objective of the micro-level analysis is to determine whether the increased risk for
violent victimization is one of the harmful consequences experienced by adolescents in
the post reform era. The national trends for working poor families, which are often high
risk settings for adolescents, may offer some clues.
Many poor children reside in families with at least one full or part time worker. In
1995 nearly 67 percent of all poor children lived in working poor families compared to
about 73 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 57 percent of blacks, and 69 percent of
Hispanics, but by 2000 this proportion had increased to almost 77 percent of all poor
children, 80 percent of non-Hispanic white children, 68 percent of black children, and 82
percent of Hispanic children. So despite the fact that child poverty declined significantly
in the latter half of the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in the proportion of poor
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children living in working poor families (Child Trends, no date). This growth is likely
due to the fact that many active and former welfare recipients entered the workforce, but
yet remained poor. The same trends did not occur for all children; the proportion of all
groups of children in working poor families declined during this same time period and
continued to decrease throughout 2008.
Over the course of time, the proportion of poor children in working poor families
declined. By 2005, the proportion of all poor children in working poor families declined
by 21 percentage points while there was a 25-point reduction for Hispanic children, a 15point reduction for black children, and a 15-point reduction for non-Hispanic white
children (Child Trends, no date). What do these trends mean, if anything, for youth
violence risks? Did poverty have increased consequences for youth’s violent
victimization risks during the early post-reform period? Did this consequence diminish in
the early 2000s, possibly as low-income working parents accumulated enough work
experience to secure better paying jobs? Addressing these issues will hopefully contribute
to the understanding of how the consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization
have changed over time and whether these consequences were more important after the
passage of welfare reform.
Summary and Objectives
In sum, criminologists have extensively examined the effects of economic
deprivation on crime, but there is still much to learn about the specific effects of absolute
deprivation on youth violent crime. One issue to be resolved is the measurement of youth
economic deprivation and I argue that the child poverty rate is particularly useful for this
purpose. Indicators of absolute deprivation generally have limited relevance to youth
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because of their limited access to work and income. However, indicators based on family
income, as is the case with the official child poverty rate, are particularly important for
adolescents who depend primarily on the family unit for support.
Changes in the child poverty rate have also been linked to youth homicide arrest
trends (Messner, et al., 2001), and the distinct trends in child poverty that occurred
between 1993 and 2004 offer a unique opportunity to examine their relationship with
youth violent victimization trends. Moreover, the social and economic developments that
also occurred during this time offer the opportunity to examine the influence that
economic and social policy changes may have had on these trends.
The economic expansion of the 1990s led to significant improvements in the job
market for low-skilled workers, which in turn contributed to dramatic reductions in
poverty for families and children (Nichols, 2006). The most prominent reductions were
experienced by the groups most likely to occupy the bottom of the job market: minorities
and female-headed families. The economic expansion was followed by a brief recession
and slow recovery period that hit all families. The child poverty rate also increased
modestly during this period, with the most substantial increases for black children and
female-headed families.
By assessing the association between various child poverty and youth violence
trends, it is possible to gain important insights into the influence of larger economic
conditions on this relationship. The trends in child poverty that occurred in the 1990s and
early 2000s have been largely attributed to changes in economic growth and given the
association between child poverty and youth violence trends, it is possible that the
economic changes that contributed to poverty trends also contributed to the trends in
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youth violence. Moreover, this research will contribute to the literature by assessing the
differences in similarities in the violence trends of various sub-groups, including nonHispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth. Previous research has focused
predominately on the differences between black and white youth. The analysis of youth
violence trends disaggregated by family structure is also an important contribution to the
literature as these trends have not been previously examined.
From a social policy perspective, the passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 was an important development. The Act
was the first federal law to explicitly promote marriage (and work) as a means of
improving the social and economic well-being of disadvantaged children (Shields &
Behrman, 2002). Researchers have examined the effects of welfare reform on children’s
school engagement and academic performance, behavioral and emotional problems,
physical health, and economic well-being (e.g. Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006; Gennetian, et
al., 2002), but have failed to consider the possibility that it had some effect on youth
violence trends.
This negligence is due partly to the lack of available data but it has also proven
difficult to isolate the effects of welfare reform from other factors such as the strong
economy and expansions to the EITC. While it is not possible to estimate the independent
effects of welfare reform on the child poverty reductions of the late 1990s, it is likely that
it interacted with other economic forces to cause an accelerated post-reform decline.
Therefore the goal of this research is not to establish a causal relationship between
welfare reform and youth violence trends, but to generally determine if the early post
reform period was significant for youth violent victimization trends.
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Though policymakers hoped that welfare reform would improve the social and
economic well-being of disadvantaged families and children, many continued to face
serious financial struggles despite complying with federal work requirements. Moreover,
experimental evaluations of welfare reform suggest that adolescents whose parents
participated in welfare-to-work programs tended to do worse in school and display more
problem behaviors than adolescents in non-participating families (Gennetian et al., 2002).
Some researchers have attributed the adverse outcomes to factors such as
adolescents’ increased responsibility in the home. Moreover, this increase in
responsibility is more likely to yield problem behaviors when youth live in high-risk
settings such as poor families (Brooks et al., 2001). Given the post-reform growth in the
proportion of poor children in working poor families, it is plausible that the mandatory
work requirements enacted by welfare reform inadvertently exacerbated the
consequences of poverty for youth’s violent victimization risk. However, it is also
possible that these consequences diminished as working families accumulated work
experience, family resources, etc. Previous research has failed to consider whether the
strength of the relationship between economic deprivation and youth violent
victimization risks have varied over time. By examining a time frame that includes a preand post-reform period, this research will be able to offer some insight into how the
consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization risks have changed before and
after welfare reform.
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CHAPTER 3
GOALS, DATA, AND MEASURES
This chapter is organized into three main sections: Research Goals, Data, and
Measures. The first section outlines the various research questions to be addressed in this
study; a summary table is also included for purposes of reference. The next section
briefly describes the methodology of the National Crime Victimization Survey--the data
source for this project--followed by a more detailed discussion of its strengths and
limitations for the purposes of this research. The final section outlines the creation of key
measures and presents relevant sample characteristics.
Research Goals
The objectives of this research are numerous, but may be summarized into three
overarching goals: 1) to determine whether larger changes in the economy influence
youth violence trends, 2) to assess whether welfare reform had any impact on rates of
youth violence, and 3) to estimate the independent effects of poverty on youth’s risks for
violence and determine if the strength of this relationship has changed over time.
Pursuant to the first two goals, the following research questions will be addressed at the
macro-level:


Did youth violent victimization rates fall most substantially for black and
Hispanic youth during the economic expansion of the 1990s? Did youth in
female-headed families also experience a more substantial decrease in violent
victimization than youth in married couple families during this time?
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Did black youth experience the largest increase in violent victimization during
the weak economic conditions of the early 2000s? Did youth in female-headed
families also experience the largest increase?



Did Hispanic youth experience the most substantial decrease in violent
victimization during the early post-reform period? Did youth in female-headed
families also experience the largest decrease?

The poverty trends for minority children and female-headed families displayed acute
sensitivity to economic changes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These research questions
will assess whether violent victimization trends disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and
family structure responded similarly to the changes in the economy. In addition, trends
will be disaggregated by age, gender, and metropolitan status to not only assess whether
there are important sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence relationship, but
to determine if changes in group-specific youth poverty rates are more closely related to
disaggregated victimization trends than changes in the overall poverty rate. Finally, these
research questions will assess whether post-reform changes in youth poverty are
associated with trends in youth violent victimization in the late 1990s.
The final set of research questions will assess the individual level relationship
between poverty and youth’s risks for violent victimization over time, specifically
addressing the possibility that the consequences of family poverty for youth’s
victimization risks were amplified during the early post-reform period but diminished
over time. Hence, the research questions that will be addressed in the micro-level analysis
are as follows:
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Have the consequences of poverty for youth violent victimization changed over
time? If so, are these changes associated with the mandatory work requirements
enacted by the 1996 welfare reforms?

In addition to assessing the changing significance of poverty for youth’s violence risks,
this analysis will also determine the independent effects of poverty on youth violence
risks net of race, ethnicity, family structure, and other controls (see Table 3.1 for a
summary of research questions).
Data
National Crime Victimization Survey
This project utilizes data from the 1993-2004 NCVS, an ongoing national survey
sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The NCVS has collected information on
nonfatal violent and property crimes against households and individuals age 12 and older
since 1973. Using a multi-stage sampling technique, a nationally representative sample
of 76,000 households is selected to participate in the NCVS each year, yielding
interviews with approximately 135,000 individuals (BJS, no date). The national
household sample is drawn from the Decennial Census, which is an advantage over
sampling techniques such as random digit dialing that exclude households without
telephone access. Selected households remain in the NCVS sample for three years and
interviews are conducted with household members age 12 and older every six months.
Strengths of the NCVS. The NCVS employs several methodological strategies to
ensure that incidents are accurately reported. First, information is gathered through a selfresponse method in which direct interviews are conducted with as many eligible
household members as possible.
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Table 3.1
Summary of Macro-and Micro-Level Research Questions
Macro-level questions
Primary
1) Did youth violent victimization rates fall most substantially for black and Hispanic
youth during the economic expansion period (i.e. 1993 to 2000)? Did youth in femaleheaded families also experience a more substantial decrease in violent victimization than
youth in married couple families during this time?
2) Did black youth experience the largest increase in violent victimization during the
weak economic conditions of the early 2000s (i.e. 2001 to 2004)? Did youth in femaleheaded families also experience the largest increase in victimization during this time?
3) Did Hispanic youth experience the largest decrease in violent victimization during the
early post reform period (i.e. 1997 to 2000)? Did youth in female-headed families also
experience larger post-reform reductions in victimization than youth in married couple
families?
Secondary
4) Are there significant sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence
relationship?
5) Are group-specific changes in youth poverty more closely related to group-specific
youth violent victimization trends than changes in the overall youth poverty rate?
6) Are there significant differences between the poverty-youth violence relationships of
the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods?
Micro-level questions
1) Have the consequences of poverty for youth’s violent victimization risks changed over
time? If so, are the changes associated with mandatory work requirements enacted by the
1996 welfare reforms?
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Proxy interviews may be conducted on behalf of those who are mentally or physically
incapacitated to the extent that granting an interview is not possible as well as for 12 and
13 year olds when insisted upon by a knowledgeable household member.
Second, a screening process is used to determine whether or not reported
incidents constitute a crime. Respondents are first prompted to report incidents through a
series of screening questions and for each incident reported during this initial screening,
detailed information is collected and recorded in an incident report including the victimoffender relationship, presence of weapons, extent of injuries, and whether or not the
crime was reported to the police. Based on the details in this report, incidents are then
classified by type of victimization and level of completion.
Third, NCVS interviews are bounded to reduce the effects of telescoping, or the
reporting of incidents that occur outside the six month reference period. Bounding is a
technique that uses the information gathered in each interview as a point of reference for
subsequent interviews to ensure that duplicate incidents are not counted. As such, the
initial interview is only used for bounding purposes and does not count toward
victimization estimates. Past studies of National Crime Survey (NCS) data have found
that unbounded interviewing can inflate victimization estimates by as much as 50%
(Biderman & Cantor, 1984).
Additional strengths make the NCVS a valuable tool for social science research
including large sample sizes and high response rates. Between 1993 and 2004, completed
interviews were obtained from roughly 980,000 individuals in over 540,000 households,
with response rates ranging from 93% to 86% and 96% to 91% respectively; the present
study is based on an unweighted sample of more than 300,000 persons between the ages
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of 12 and 17. When weighted, however, this sample is nationally representative of nearly
2.85 million youths. The large sample size, small sampling errors, and high participation
rates contribute to the reliability and generalizability of NCVS estimates.
Specific advantages of the NCVS for the purposes of this project include the
availability of data over many years, a wide range of important demographic information,
and measures of Latino ethnicity. With more than 35 years of data on criminal
victimization, the NCVS allows for the study of long-term trends in youth violence and
because the data contain detailed victim and household demographic information, these
trends can be disaggregated to better understand how youth violence trends vary by
family structure and racial/ethnic origin--two of the key predictors of child poverty. A
particular benefit of using the NCVS to disaggregate youth violence trends by race and
ethnicity is that it is the only national crime survey that taps the Latino ethnicity of
victims (Lauritsen & Heimer, 2010).
The NCVS also contains information on family size and income that are largely
unavailable in other youth surveys. This information will be used to approximate a
measure of the official poverty thresholds that are used by the Census Bureau to
determine the poverty status of individuals and families. Moreover, the wealth of
demographic information available in the NCVS also makes it possible to estimate
poverty rates for specific groups such as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and
Hispanic youths.
Finally, the NCVS may be used to conduct individual-level analyses despite its
hierarchical file structure. Data collected by the NCVS are stored into four files: address
ID, household, person, and incident. The first two files contain identifiers and
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demographic information for every address and household selected into the NCVS
sample while the person file contains similar information for every eligible participant in
the sample household. Finally, the incident file contains information about the nature and
characteristics of each household and personal victimization incident reported by NCVS
respondents.
Figure 3.1 crudely illustrates the hierarchical organization of these files. The first
full level consists of the address ID records, which provide important information on the
addresses selected into the sample (in the NCVS, it is the address--not the individuals
residing at the address--that is drawn into the sample). In turn, each address ID
corresponds with a specific unit in the household file (i.e. the household residing at the
address). According to the present example, our NCVS dataset consists of three address
records that specifically correspond to three household records in the household-level
file.
Because interviews are conducted with every member of the sample household
ages 12 and older, each household unit can potentially generate several person records. In
this example, a total of seven individuals can be linked to the three households in the
sample with each person ‘belonging’ to a specific household unit in the household-level
file. Finally, each person may report several victimization incidents or none at all,
generating a separate record for each in the incident-level file. The seven individuals in
the present example reported a total of eleven victimization incidents. However, the
incidents per person range from zero to four.
Storing these data in a fixed record length format such as a rectangular, or
flattened file, is impractical for a couple of reasons. Perhaps the most obvious is that it
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Figure 3.1
Illustration of NCVS Hierarchical File Structure
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would generate a very large dataset that would no doubt prove difficult to manage, but
more importantly, a rectangular file would produce a large amount of missing data. To fit
all the data in Figure 3.1 into a rectangular file, it would have to be large enough to
accommodate every possible combination of persons and incidents, the maximum of
which is five. Hence, the complete record for household one would require a space for
the address ID, household, and five configurations of persons and incidents: person1incident1, person1-incident2, person2-incident1, person2-incident2, person3, and
person4-incident1; in addition to the address ID and household, the record for household
two would contain the following five configurations: person1-incident1, person1incident2, person1-incident3, person1-incident4, and person2-incident1. Between
households one and two, there are only three person-incident combinations that overlap
(i.e. person1-incident1, person1-incident2, and person2-incident1), which obviously
means that each record would contain a large amount of missing data; with only one
overlap in household three (i.e. person1-incident1), the missing data in record three
would be even more significant.
For these reasons, it is more efficient to organize a complex dataset such as the
NCVS in a hierarchical file structure. However, it does present some challenges for
empirical analyses, particularly at the micro-level. It is not possible to examine the effects
of household-related factors on one’s risk for violent victimization, for example, if the
household information is in one file and the incident information is in another file.
Fortunately, however, each NCVS file includes a set of identification variables that may
be used to draw a link between the address, household, person, and incident- level files,
providing a way to connect each household to every household member that participated
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in the survey and each survey participant to their reported victimization incidents. Thus,
the identification variables provide a way to collapse the hierarchically-organized files
into a flat file that contains all of the relevant address, household, person, and incident
information for each respondent in the NCVS. This particular method was used to create
a series of thirteen flattened files for each year in the NCVS sample, which in turn were
used to conduct individual-level analyses.
Creating the flattened files is an involved process that starts with downloading
and bounding the files by interview year. Obviously, linking the various NCVS files will
generate a large amount of data, so it is important to take steps to make the files more
manageable. This is done in the incident level file by first recoding the variables into
more refined categories such as the type of victimization incident, presence of injury and
weapons, and location of the incident. Next, a subset of both the recoded incident and
person level files is created containing only those variables relevant to the present
research. A unique person identification number is then created for each case in both the
person and incident level files by stringing together the NCVS identification variables:
ICPSR household identification number, year and quarter identification, sample number,
scrambled control number, and household number. The cases are then sorted by the
newly created person identification number and a variable is created in the incident file to
tap the number of incidents reported by each person. A set of codes is used to create four
vectors for each variable in the recoded incident file and place the correct incident
information into these vectors. The appropriate variable names and value labels are then
assigned to each vector and a set of codes that test the aggregating function designed to
flatten the incident file is run. Finally, the flattened incident file is merged with the
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person file by the person identification variable and a flattened file is created that
contains the relevant variables from each file level for every respondent in the NCVS
sample.
Limitations of the NCVS. Though the NCVS generates a large, nationally
representative sample, high response rates, and detailed information about criminal
victimization that cannot be found in most official data sources, there are limitations.
Because the NCVS is an address-based sample, it excludes homeless youths and those
living in group quarters or institutional settings such as juvenile detention centers. Also
excluded from the sample are children under the age 12, so it is not possible to assess the
consequences of poverty for childhood victimization.
The NCVS also has two important limitations for the empirical study of youth
violence: atheoretical measures and the exclusion of community-level variables.
According to social disorganization and ecological theories of crime, for example,
community-level disadvantage plays a major indirect role in neighborhood rates of crime
and delinquency. In addition, research has linked other indicators of community
disadvantage such as the percent of female-headed households to adolescent’s risk for
violent victimization (Lauritsen, 2003). With the absence of theory-based measures and
community-level variables in the NCVS, it is impossible to test any theoretical
assumptions about the association between community-level deprivation and youth
violence trends or assess the relative impact of individual and community level factors on
the changing consequences of poverty over time.
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Measures
The key measures to be analyzed in this project are violent victimization, poverty,
family structure, and race and ethnicity. To determine the association between youth
poverty and violent crime at the macro-level, violent victimization trends will be
disaggregated by family structure and race and ethnicity--two of the most important
demographic predictors of youth poverty. At the micro-level, I will assess whether the
consequences of poverty have changed for youth’s violent victimization risks over time
net of their family living arrangements and racial and ethnic origin. Three additional
correlates of youth violence will serve as controls: gender (‘0=female’ and ‘1=male’),
urban residency (‘0=non-urban’ and ‘1=urban’), and whether adolescents are younger
(‘0=12 to 14’) or older (‘1=15 to 17’). Table 3.2 summarizes the distribution of the
sample along these measures.
Dependent Variables
Violent victimization. The dependent variable for the micro-level portion of this
project is violent victimization, which is coded ‘0=no’ or ‘1=yes’ if respondents reported
at least one attempted or completed incident of the following crimes: simple assault,
aggravated assault, robbery, and rape/sexual assault. Attacks not involving the use of a
weapon are classified as simple assaults while aggravated assaults include attempted or
completed attacks committed with a weapon or completed attacks resulting in serious
injury. Robberies are classified as thefts committed with force or threat of force and
rape/sexual assaults include attacks involving unwanted sexual contact or forced
intercourse.
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Table 3.2
Characteristics of NCVS Youth Sample, 1993-2004a

Year

Poverty Status*
Above At/Below

Family Structure*
Married
Female
Couple
Headed

Race and Ethnicity*
Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
White
Black

1993

69.9

20.5

71.1

23.1

68.4

16.0

11.1

1994

68.1

22.2

72.1

22.4

67.6

15.8

12.1

1995

70.2

20.3

71.5

22.9

67.3

15.5

12.5

1996

69.7

19.8

71.3

22.8

67.0

15.3

12.8

1997

68.7

20.4

69.7

24.2

65.2

15.9

13.7

1998

69.0

18.6

68.8

24.8

65.3

15.7

13.7

1999

67.1

18.1

68.9

24.7

64.5

15.5

14.2

2000

67.6

16.4

68.4

24.9

64.4

15.5

14.5

2001

67.0

16.3

68.5

24.8

64.1

15.7

14.8

2002

66.0

15.1

68.4

25.0

62.8

16.3

15.8

2003

65.8

15.4

67.0

25.8

60.7

15.0

17.7

2004

65.4

15.6

66.6

26.5

60.3

15.0

18.2

Total

67.8

18.1

67.8

22.7

64.7

15.6

14.3
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Violent
Year

Gender
Male
Female

1993

51.3

48.7

51.7

48.3

73.7

26.3

125.6

1994

51.3

48.7

51.0

49.0

72.9

27.1

127.5

1995

51.2

48.8

51.0

49.0

72.9

27.1

112.9

1996

51.2

48.8

50.7

49.3

72.6

27.4

102.1

1997

51.3

48.7

50.0

50.0

71.5

28.5

93.3

1998

51.1

48.9

50.3

49.7

72.3

27.7

87.0

1999

51.2

48.8

50.4

49.6

73.1

26.9

77.4

2000

51.2

48.8

50.2

49.8

72.2

27.8

59.9

2001

51.1

48.9

50.2

49.8

72.5

27.5

58.4

2002

51.4

48.6

51.1

48.9

72.4

27.6

49.1

2003

51.2

48.8

51.8

48.2

71.2

28.8

55.8

2004

51.2

48.8

51.1

48.9

72.7

27.3

46.3

Total

51.2

48.8

50.8

49.2

72.5

27.5

81.8

a

Age
12 to 14 15 to 17

Urban
Non-urban Urban

Victimization Rate
(per 1,000)

Values represent percentages unless otherwise noted.
Total and within category percentages may not equal 100 because the percentage of
missing data and other excluded categories are omitted.

*
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To assess the association between youth poverty and violent victimization rates at
the macro-level, the youth violent victimization rate is also calculated for each year in the
sample. To create this rate, the number of violent victimizations reported by youths
during the interview year (numerator) is divided by the total youth population in that year
(denominator) and multiplied by 1,000 as depicted below. The interview, or collection,
year covers a 12 month interview period as opposed to the data year, which covers the
entire 18 month NCVS interview period. The former is used by the BJS to calculate
victimization estimates in their annual Criminal Victimization reports.
 Total # violent incidents (12-17) 
 x 1,000
Youth violent victimization rate  
 Total population (12-17)

The total number of violent incidents is generated from the 1992-2005
concatenated incident file and weighed by the NCVS person weight (v3080), which is an
estimation of the population that each person in the sample represents. By applying the
person weight, therefore, it is possible to estimate the total number of violent
victimizations in the national youth population. The denominators are generated in the
person file and similarly weighed by the person weight to estimate the total youth
population each year. Because estimates are not based on the full 18 month interview
period, however, the person weight had to be adjusted to produce the appropriate annual
estimates. This process was used to generate both total victimization rates and group
specific rates by age, gender, family structure, race and ethnicity, and metropolitan status.
The only difference is that the numerators and denominators are based on the number of
victimizations reported by a specific group of youths and the total at-risk population
respectively. To generate the youth violent victimization rate for males in female-headed
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families, for example, the numerator would consist of the number of violent incidents
reported by young males in female-headed households and the denominator would
consist of the total population of young males in female-headed households.
Independent Variables
Poverty. To determine the poverty status of individuals and families, the Census
Bureau uses a set of poverty thresholds that were initially developed by economist Molly
Orchansky in 1963-64. The initial thresholds were based on an economy food plan
developed by the Department of Agriculture and adjusted by family size, sex of the
householder, the number of children under 18, and farm residency. In 1969, the
thresholds were revised and the Consumer Price Index was established as the standard for
annual inflation adjustments. That same year the thresholds were adopted as the federal
definition of poverty. The adjustments for farm families and female-headed households
were eventually eliminated in 1981 and family size was extended to 9 or more people,
retaining family size and the number of children under 18 as the key factors used to
adjust the federal threshold amounts (Fisher, 1992). Thus, a family and all of its members
are considered to be in poverty if their total cash income falls below the designated
poverty threshold for a family of their size and composition.
Using the federal thresholds as a guideline, a similar method is used to create
poverty thresholds in the NCVS. A precise replication is not possible because the NCVS
lacks a continuous measure of household income. Instead, threshold categories are
created using the total number of members in each household and a categorical measure
of household income that ranges from $5,000 to ≥ $75,000. Respondents are considered
to be ‘0=above poverty’ if their household income category is greater than the federal
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poverty threshold for a family of their size or ‘1=at or below poverty’ if their income
category falls below, or includes, the poverty threshold.
Because the federal thresholds are updated annually for inflation, the threshold
amount for a given family varies from year to year. For instance, the poverty threshold
for a family of three was $13,738 in 2000 and $14,128 in 2001. Due to the variance in
annual threshold amounts, separate poverty codes are created for each year in the NCVS
sample. As previously noted, the code consists of two major components: household size
and household income. The total household size is created by summing two continuous
measures of the ‘number of household members 12 years and older’ and the ‘number of
household members younger than 12 years’ and household income consists of fourteen
categories: 1)  5,000; 2) 5,000-7,499; 3) 7,500-9,999; 4) 10,000-12,499; 5) 12,50014,999; 6) 15,000-17,499; 7) 17,500-19,999; 8) 20,000-24,999; 9) 25,000-29,999; 10)
30,000-34,999; 11) 35,000-39,999; 12) 40,000-49,999; 13) 50,000-74,999; 14) ≥ 75,000.
Table 3.3 presents the information used to create the poverty code for 2004, the
most recent year in the sample. According to these figures, respondents in a family of
four are considered to be ‘at or below poverty’ if their category of household income is
less than or equal to $17,500-$19,999, which encompasses the federal poverty threshold
for a family of four--$19,307 (see U.S. Census Bureau, ‘Poverty Thresholds 2004’ for
detailed threshold matrix). Thus, respondents in a family of four are considered to be
poor if their income falls into categories 1 through 7.
To assess the external validity of this measure, the NCVS youth poverty estimates
are compared to those generated for all children under 18 in the Current Population
Survey (see Appendix A). The estimates are similar to each other in trend and magnitude,
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differing by no more than about two percentage points each year. The trends began to
diverge after 2001 when missing income data in the NCVS approached 20%. However,
reducing this missing income data is challenging because the NCVS does not contain
additional poverty and child well-being indicators such as household receipt of public
assistance and food stamps, health insurance coverage, and child support receipt that can
be used to impute family poverty or create alternative measures of child well-being.
Family structure. In addition to household size and income, the NCVS also uses
a family structure code to tap the composition of households in the survey. The family
structure code broadly classifies families into those headed by husbands and wives or
single males or females, and configures each family group according to the presence of
children, other relatives, and non-relatives. For example, married couple families with a
male householder, or reference person, are configured in the following way: ‘1=Male ref
wife/child/relative’;‘2=Male ref wife/child/non-relative’;‘3= Male ref wife/child/nonrelative/relative’;‘4=Male ref wife/child’;‘5=Male ref wife/relative’;‘6=Male ref
wife/non-relative’;‘7=Male ref wife/relative/non-relative’;‘8= Male ref wife’. This
classification scheme results in 33 configurations of family living arrangements,
including other combinations not captured by the family structure code.
These configurations may be coded into more refined categories of family
structure including married couple families with or without children, single parent
families headed by males or females, and single adult households. For example, the
categories representative of married couples and their own biological children are 1-4 and
17-20, but to capture all of the biological, related, and/or unrelated children residing in
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Table 3.3
Example of Census Bureau Poverty Thresholds and NCVS Threshold Categories, 2004
(in dollars)
Household size
1

a

Census Poverty Thresholds
9,645

NCVS threshold categoriesa
5,000 (1)
5,000-7,499 (2)
7,500-9,999 (3)

2

12,334

10,000-12,499

3

15,067

12,500-14,999 (5)
15,000-17,499 (6)

4

19,307

17,500-19,999

(7)

5

23,831

20,000-24,999

(8)

6

25,788

25,000-29,999

(9)

7

29,236

25,000-29,999

(9)

8

32,641

30,000-34,999 (10)

≥9

39,048

35,000-39,999 (11)

Category number in parentheses.

(4)
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married couple families, the categories must be expanded to include 1-7 and 17-23.
Married couples without children include (8) ‘male reference wife’ and (23) ‘female
reference husband’ (see Table 3.4).
Additionally, the specific relationship between the householder and each
household member is measured and coded into general categories of spouses, children,
parents, siblings, other relatives, and non-relatives. This information is useful for
determining the respondent’s precise relationship to the head of household and estimating
the percentage of related children in the sample. The NCVS does not assess the
relationship between respondents and other members of the household, however, so
estimates cannot be generated for youths living with cohabiting couples or single parents
who ‘double up’ to share resources--an arrangement that increased significantly among
low-income parents who were not receiving welfare during the early post-reform period
(Loprest & Zedlewski, 2006).
The two categories of family structure to be examined in this project are
‘0=married couple’ and ‘1=female-headed families’, the latter being the primary target of
welfare reform policies enacted in the 1990s. To create these two categories, the family
structure code is reconfigured and categories 1-7 and 17-23 are coded as married couple
families while categories 25-31 are coded as female-headed families. The remaining
categories are collapsed into the ‘residue’ category, which is applied to those cases in
which respondents were either unwilling or unable to provide information about family
living arrangements or provided a response that did not fall into any of the predetermined categories in the family structure code.
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Table 3.4
Categories in NCVS family structure code
1) Male ref wife/child/relative

18) Female ref husband/child/non-relative

2) Male ref wife/child/non-relative

19) Female ref husband/child/relative/non-relative

3) Male ref wife/child/relative/non-relative

20) Female ref husband/child

4) Male ref wife/child

21) Female ref husband/relative

5) Male ref wife/relative

22) Female ref husband/non-relative

6) Male ref wife/non-relative

23) Female ref husband/relative/non-relative

7) Male ref wife/relative/non-relative

24) Female ref husband

8) Male ref wife

25) Lone female ref child/relative

9) Lone male ref child/relative

26) Lone female ref child/non-relative

10) Lone male ref child/non-relative

27) Lone female ref child/relative/non-relative

11) Lone male ref child/relative/non-relative

28) Lone female ref child

12) Lone male ref child

29) Lone female ref relative

13) Lone male ref relative

30) Lone female ref non-relative

14) Lone male ref non-relative

31) Lone female ref relative/non-relative

15) Lone male ref relative/non-relative

32) Lone female ref

16) Lone male ref

33) Other combination

17) Female ref husband/child/relative
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About 69% of the sample consists of youths who live in married couple families
and the majority of these youths are the couple’s own children (95.2%). Those remaining
are other relatives (4.0%) and non-relatives (0.7%). The percentage residing in femaleheaded families is roughly 24%, which is comprised of about 87.2% of the householder’s
own children, 11.0% of other relatives, and 1.7% of non-relatives. The remaining 9% of
the sample consists of youths in other family living arrangements and missing data.
The external validity of these estimates is also assessed through comparisons with
CPS estimates of children’s living arrangements (U.S. Census Bureau, no date). The
NCVS estimates of the percentage of youths in married couple families are nearly
identical to those produced by the CPS, save slightly higher percentages from 1994 to
1997. Comparatively, there is less precision in the female-headed family estimates but it
is clear that the two sets of trends follow very similar patterns. The apparent exception is
the decrease in CPS and increase in NCVS estimates around 1997, at which point the
former estimates fall slightly below the latter. Minor discrepancies aside, the trends are
sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that the NCVS produces reliable estimates
of children’s living arrangements.
Race and ethnicity. The NCVS uses Census guidelines and practices to tap race
and ethnicity. Prior to 2003, the federal guidelines for race classification were based on
respondents self-reports of one of five racial categories: American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo,
Asian/Pacific Islander, black, white, or other. In an effort to reflect changes in national
diversity, the guidelines were effectively changed in January 2003 to allow respondents
to select one or more racial categories revised to identify Asians as a distinct racial
group: American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native
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Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, or White. These changes resulted in twenty categories
of race alone or in combination in the 2003-2004 NCVS, though the overwhelming
majority of youths reported only one race. The NCVS also uses a self-report of ‘Hispanic
origin’ to determine whether or not respondents are of Hispanic descent, regardless of
race.
Responses to the ‘race’ and ‘Hispanic origin’ questions are combined to create
categories representing the three largest racial and ethnic groups in the U.S., ‘1= nonHispanic whites’, ‘2=non-Hispanic blacks’, and ‘3=Hispanics’. Due to the 2003 revisions
to the race category, a separate race and ethnicity code is created for the 2003 and 2004
NCVS files that essentially recodes the twenty categories of race alone or in combination
into the five original racial groups. The largest group in the sample is non-Hispanic
whites (64.7%), followed by non-Hispanic blacks (15.6%) and Hispanics (14.3%); about
5.4% of the data were missing. Between 2002 and 2004, however, the share of nonHispanic blacks declined from 16.3% to 15.0% while the share of Hispanics increased
from 15.8% to 18.2% and surpassed blacks as the largest minority group in the sample in
2003.
Summary
The overall objective of this research is two-fold: 1) to assess the impact of recent
macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on youth violent victimization
trends and 2) to determine whether the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence
risks have changed over time and whether these changes are associated with welfare
reform. To achieve these objectives, data from the 1993-2004 NCVS will be analyzed at
both the macro- and micro-level. For the purposes of this research, the NCVS has several
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advantages including a wealth of household and family demographic data such as
household income and family structure, a measure of Hispanic origin, and a large sample
of youth that is nationally representative of nearly 285 million persons. However, a
disadvantage of using the NCVS is that it does not allow for theoretical testing or
community-level analyses.
The key independent variables of poverty, race and ethnicity, and family structure
are meant to capture individual and family characteristics that are associated with youth
violence while gender, age, and metropolitan status serve as demographic controls. At the
macro-level, race/ethnicity, family structure, and demographic controls will essentially
serve as contingencies in the poverty-violence relationships of the economic expansion,
early post-reform, and economic downturn periods while at the micro-level, all variables
will be regressed on youth’s violence risks before, immediately after, and several years
after TANF implementation--the independent variable for both sets of analyses being
youth violence. The following two chapters will outline the analytic strategy and present
findings for the macro- and micro-level analyses, beginning with the former.
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CHAPTER 4
MACRO-LEVEL ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND FINDINGS
The primary objective of this chapter is to present findings from the macro-level
analysis, which centers on the association between poverty and youth violent
victimization trends over three distinct time periods: economic expansion (1993-2000),
early post-reform (1997-2000), and economic downturn (2001-2004). Before presenting
the findings, however, the analytic strategy will be described.
Analytic Strategy
The macro-level analysis will employ the use of two strategies. The first will
utilize a series of graphs to gather prima facie facts about the association between youth
poverty and violent victimization trends for all youth and various youth subgroups. The
information in the graphs will provide important details about poverty and violent
victimization trends including the differences between the economic expansion, early
post-reform, and economic downturn periods, the similarities and differences in various
group trends, and the extent that violent victimization rates co-vary with overall and
group-specific poverty rates.
In the first series of graphs, violent victimization trends are disaggregated by race
and ethnicity and plotted in tandem with overall and group-specific poverty rates, which
will be reproduced for males and females, younger and older adolescents, and urban and
non-urban youth. For all groups, graphs will be presented in pairs--one comparing the
violent victimization rates of non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic
youth to overall poverty rates and the other comparing violent victimization rates to
group-specific poverty.
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A total of fourteen graphs will be produced for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic
black, and Hispanic youth, all of which are based on the author’s own calculations and
analysis of NCVS data: 1) total and 2) group-specific poverty and violent victimization
rates for all non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth; 3) total and 4)
group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for male sub-groups; 5) total and 6)
group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for female sub-groups; 7) total and
8) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for younger adolescent subgroups; 9) total and 10) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for older
adolescent sub-groups; 11) total and 12) group-specific poverty and violent victimization
rates for urban sub-groups; 13) total and 14) group-specific poverty and violent
victimization rates for non-urban sub-groups. To ease the comparison of poverty and
violent victimization trends for the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic
downturn periods, each graph contains clear demarcations of the periods under review.
For the second series of graphs, violent victimization trends are disaggregated by
two categories of family structure: married couple and female-headed families. Again,
these trends are compared to overall and group-specific poverty trends in the following
series of graphs: 1) total and 2) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for
all youth in married couple and female-headed families: 3) total and 4) group-specific
poverty and violent victimization rates for male sub-groups; 5) total and 6) group-specific
poverty and violent victimization rates for female sub-groups; 7) total and group-specific
poverty and violent victimization rates for younger adolescent sub-groups; 9) total and
10) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for older adolescent subgroups; 11) total and 12) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for urban
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sub-groups; 13) total and 14) group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates for
non-urban sub-groups.
Because the trends are largely disaggregated, all of the poverty and violent
victimization rates displayed in the graphs are smoothed using three-year moving
averages. Smoothing is particularly important for this analysis because high levels of
disaggregation produce groups with small numbers of cases, resulting in estimates with
wide confidence intervals and low precision. In addition to high disaggregation, group
sample sizes may also be affected by declining violent crime rates and NCVS sample
reductions in 1995, both of which make it difficult to assess year-to-year changes in
youth violent victimization in a meaningful way. Smoothing addresses these issues by
essentially tripling sample sizes each year.
While the graphs may illustrate the extent of co-variation between youth poverty
and violent victimization trends, they cannot tell us about the strength of the relationship.
Therefore, the second strategy involved in the macro-level analysis is the estimation of
first differenced poverty-violent victimization correlations to determine the strength of
the association between the two. More importantly, however, first differencing is used to
correct for the possibility that the factors (i.e. observed or unobserved) that influence
changes in youth poverty and violent victimization one year also affect similar changes in
subsequent years throughout the series, thus removing the ‘common thread’ from the two
trends and allowing for a better assessment of how year-to-year changes in poverty affect
year-to-year changes in youth violent victimization. First-differenced correlations will be
estimated for total groups and all youth groups as well as for the entire period (i.e. 1993-
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2004) and the economic expansion (i.e. 1993-2000), early post-reform (i.e. 1997-2000),
and economic downturn (i.e. 2001-2004) periods.
Results
Before addressing the specific macro-level research questions, it is important to
highlight the poverty and violent victimization trends for all youth in the sample. This
information will provide a point of comparison for disaggregated trends. Figure 4.1
depicts annual average poverty and violent victimization rates1 for the total sample of
youth in the 1993- 2004 NCVS, the former plotted on the secondary y-axis and the latter
plotted on the primary. As previously described, the highlighted segments of the graph
demarcate the early post-reform and economic downturn periods. The figure reveals a
fairly steady decline in both poverty and violent victimization over the economic
expansion period, though victimization fell more steeply than poverty; while the former
declined by more than forty-eight percent, the latter declined by roughly twenty-one
percent. Nonetheless, these patterns suggest some association between expansion-era
poverty and violence trends, which is confirmed by the correlation of first differences
(r=.67, p<.10).
The reductions continued as expected throughout the early post-reform period but
although poverty declines accelerated slightly after 1998, marked reductions in violence
were not evident. Recall that the implementation of TANF coincided with the economic
expansion, contributing to hastened declines in child poverty in the late 1990s. Hence,
noting the presence or absence of marked post-reform violence reductions is helpful in
determining the influence of welfare reform. The absence of marked reductions in total

1

The end-points, 1993 and 2004, consists of two-year averages.
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Figure 4.1
Total youth poverty and violent victimization rates, 1993-2004
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violent victimization suggests that the implementation of TANF did not play an important
role in the declines.
Nonetheless, steep violence declines resulted in the narrowing of the violencepoverty gap, from roughly six-fold at the start of the series to less than four-fold by the
end of the early post-reform period. Coinciding with the end of the early post-reform
period, the height of the economic expansion also marked a seeming convergence in
poverty and violence trends, although it is not a ‘true’ convergence because poverty and
violence are plotted on different axes. Instead, it marks the distinct point in the series
where steep violence declines intersect with slowing poverty declines.
Although it is unlikely that TANF influenced the violence trends of the early postreform period, the correlation of first differences suggests a strong association between
poverty and violence trends (r=.99, p<.05). While there may be some association between
the two, these findings most likely reflect the small number of data points during the
early post-reform (and economic downturn) period, and thus is not a reliable indicator of
post-TANF relationships. However, a review of the correlation results reveals wide
variation in the strength of the poverty-violence relationships of the early post-reform and
economic downturn periods, which suggest that the small number of data points do not
result in strong associations in each case. More often than not, moreover, the
relationships are not statistically significant, particularly in regards to the early postreform period. Still, results from these two periods should be observed with caution.
With this caveat in mind, the declines in poverty and violent victimization
persisted throughout the 2001 recession, although at a much slower pace relative to the
preceding periods. Both sets of rates also continued to decline throughout 2003 but
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compared to violence, poverty declined only marginally from year-to-year. It was not
until the last year of the series that both sets of rates upturned negligibly. After falling
twenty-eight and sixty percent between 1993 and 2003, more specifically, poverty and
violence rates respectively increased by less than (0.78) and slightly more than (1.29) one
percent in 2004.
Again, these trends do not appear to follow the expected pattern. If the economic
downturn impacted violence in the same manner that it impacted CPS child poverty, an
increase in violence would also be expected from 2001 to 2004. However, the fact that
both poverty and violence decreased throughout most of the period suggests that the
weakened state of the economy did not play a significant role. The decreases in
downturn-era NCVS poverty are peculiar but overall, the pattern does not diverge
prominently from the CPS. While total child poverty increased by 1.5 points in the CPS,
there was less than a one-point increase in NCVS total youth poverty. Nonetheless, there
is substantial co-variation in these short-term poverty and violence trends as evidenced by
the correlation of first-differences (r=.94, p<.10).
Summary. There appears to be a fairly close association between total youth
poverty and violent victimization during the economic expansion, early post-reform, and
economic downturn periods as well as over the entire series (r=.79, p<.05), although the
strength and statistical significance of the associations do vary; the strongest was found
during the early post-reform period, followed by the economic downturn and economic
expansion. These variations suggest that the poverty-violence association is more
important during some time periods than others and underscore the importance of
assessing how the relationship has changed over time. However, the violence trends also
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follow patterns that are inconsistent with macroeconomic and social policy effects,
particularly during the early post-reform and economic downturn periods.
The preceding discussion does reveal significant associations between total youth
poverty and violent victimization, and provides general knowledge about the nature of
the relationships each period. The following section will build upon this general
knowledge by examining the relationship between poverty and violence trends
disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family structure, beginning with a brief overview of
the general trends for each group and followed by a more detailed discussion of the
influence of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on these trends.
Racially disaggregated trends will be discussed first.
Violence trends by race and ethnicity
General patterns, 1993-2004
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 compare trends in total youth and group-specific poverty to
violent victimization trends for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic
youth, providing important information that cannot be discerned from Figure 4.1. Perhaps
the most apparent is that the early expansion period is marked by few distinguishable
patterns in violent victimization for each group, though it is evident that white youth
experienced the highest average rate in 1993. It is also apparent that violence rates
declined rather uniformly for white youth while fluctuating somewhat for racial and
ethnic minorities, but particularly for blacks.
Coinciding with the latter half of the expansion and implementation of TANF,
discernable patterns in violence began to emerge around 1997. At this time, average rates
were highest for white youth (97.51 per 1,000) followed by blacks (92.64 per 1,000) and
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Figure 4.2
Total youth poverty and violent victimization rates by race and ethnicity, 1993-2004
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Figure 4.3
Group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates by race and ethnicity, 1993-2004
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Hispanics (89.53 per 1,000). Over the course of the early post-reform period, rates fell
rather steadily and substantially for white (-31.35)2 and Hispanic (-29.72) youth, the latter
experiencing the lowest overall victimization rates. Conversely, there was a small spike
in black victimization rates in 1998 which was followed by a reduction of almost twentytwo points over the next two years.
The implementation of TANF served to hasten child poverty reductions in the late
1990s. It follows, therefore, that the decline in violence would show a similar
acceleration if influenced by TANF, but the small spike in black rates not only suggests
that it did not contribute but that it may have had an adverse effect on black violent
victimization. Because the spike is limited to the year immediately following
implementation, however, it is most likely due to a slight shock effect. This line of
reasoning is obviously speculative; there is no way of determining whether this increase
occurred among black youth in welfare-to-work families.
On the other hand, the sub-group trends make evident that the post-TANF spike in
black violence is largely due to a substantial increase among females, although noticeable
increases are also apparent among older adolescents and non-urban youth (see
Appendices D, F, and H). Some research suggests that girls tend to shoulder a larger
portion of the household and caretaking responsibilities in low-income and parent-absent
(i.e. due to employment) families and it is this increased responsibility that may lead to
adverse outcomes among youth (Dodson & Dickert, 2004; Brooks, Hair, & Zaslow,
2001).
Because TANF increased work efforts among single mothers, it stands to reason
that girls’ responsibilities in the home increased which in turn contributed to adverse
2

Represents raw difference score (in points).
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outcomes such as increased violent victimization. However, I argue that welfare reform
only influences violence trends through its impact on poverty, and there is no evidence
that poverty has differential effects on gender and racial groups. Nonetheless, the trends
in black violence do arouse suspicion that welfare reform may have had harmful
consequences for at least some groups of youth--a point I will explore in the following
chapter.
As the economy entered the 2001 recession, the gap between white (57.69 per
1,000), black (56.71 per 1,000), and Hispanic (55.29 per 1,000) violence rates narrowed
considerably, which is significant because the 2001 recession affected workers of all
families, earnings, racial, and ethnic groups and all groups of children experienced
modest increases in poverty. In other words, there was greater racial and ethnic equality
in the poverty increases of the economic downturn than the reductions of the economic
expansion period. But while the symmetry in white and black violence trends persisted
throughout 2004, there was a sharp divergence in Hispanic rates after 2002.
When the 2001-2004 violence trends are disaggregated by gender, age, and
metropolitan status, there is wide variation across black and white sub-groups. However,
the post-2002 drop in Hispanic violence rates is observable across all sub-groups (see
Appendices C-H). Other research has shown that Hispanic youth have lower violent
victimization rates than non-Hispanic youth, although it is not clear whether the lower
rates result from the marked drop in Hispanic violence in 2002; Baum (2005) reports that
the 1993-2003 annual average violent victimization rates for non-Hispanic white (86.7
per 1,000) and non-Hispanic black (87.0 per 1,000) youth were virtually the same, but the
Hispanic rate was 76.9 per 1,000.
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To investigate the source of this divergence, violent victimization rates are further
disaggregated by violent crime type for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and
Hispanics. Displayed in Figures 4.4 through 4.7, the results reveal interesting trends in
simple and aggravated assault that may shed some light on the racial differences in the
violence patterns. In terms of simple assault, the trends were generally similar for black
and Hispanic youth throughout 2002, at which point Hispanic rates began to veer from
converging black and white rates. The aggravated assault series also begins with higher
rates for black and Hispanic youth but after falling sharply in 2002, Hispanic rates
intersect with and fall below black and white rates--the series ending with white youth
having the highest overall rates and Hispanics the lowest. It is also important to note that
Hispanic youth experienced a marked reduction in post-2002 robbery that leveled off in
conjunction with rising black and white rates. However, white youth maintained the
lowest overall robbery rates throughout the entire series. It appears, then, that the trends
in simple and aggravated assault are driving the divergence of Hispanic violence rates
from white and black youth.
In terms of the overall association between poverty and violent victimization
trends, first-differenced correlations reveal fairly strong and statistically significant
associations for white (r=.71, p<.05) and black (r=.67, p<.05) youth that are slightly
weaker than that of all youth (r=.79, p<.01). For Hispanic youth, on the other hand, the
1993-2004 association between total poverty and violent victimization is weak and
statistically nonsignificant (r=.32). When the correlation between group-specific poverty
and violent victimization was estimated, results reveal a relatively weaker relationship for
white (r=.63, p<.05) and black (r=.11, ns) youth and a stronger, but statistically
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Figure 4.4
Rape and Sexual Assault Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
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Figure 4.5
Robbery Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
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Figure 4.6
Aggravated Assault Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
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Figure 4.7
Simple Assault Rated by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
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nonsignificant association for Hispanic (r=.46, ns) youth; all first-differenced correlation
results are displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
For the overwhelming majority of white and black youth sub-groups, however,
the total poverty-violent victimization association was stronger than that of groupspecific poverty and violence; there was no clear pattern for Hispanic sub-groups as the
former was stronger for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth and the latter was
stronger for females, older adolescents, and non-urban youth. These general patterns
reveal important overall relationships between youth poverty and violent victimization
for non-Hispanic youth. More specifically, these important relationships consist of
statistically significant associations between total poverty and violence for all nonHispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as well as group-specific poverty and violence
for non-Hispanic whites. Poverty was not significantly associated with Hispanic violence,
whether measured in terms of overall or Hispanic youth poverty.
The following section aims to determine the impact of recent macroeconomic
conditions and welfare reform policies on the poverty-violence relationship according to
two criteria. The first requires that violence trends follow the same pattern as CPS child
poverty trends, which form the bases of all macro-level research questions. Guiding this
research is the general hypothesis that given the association between poverty and
violence, larger economic conditions and social policy changes should influence violence
through its impacts on poverty trends. If indeed influenced by the same economic and
social forces that contributed to recent changes in child poverty, then, violence trends
should display similar patterns.
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Table 4.1
First Differenced Correlations of Total Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization by Race,
Ethnicity, and Family Structure
Economic
Expansion
(1993-2000)

Early PostReform
(1997-2000)
TOTAL SAMPLE

Economic
Downturn
(2001-2004)

Total
(1993-2004)

.50
(.2575)
.42
(.3443)
.55
(.1961)

.63
(.3727)
.43
(.5685)
.29
(.7127)

.99**
(.0106)
.96**
(.0352)
-.16
(.8379)

.71**
(.0143)
.67**
(.0248)
.32
(.3392)

.17
(.7080)
.73*
(.0607)
.67*
(.0962)

-.99***
(.0091)
.99**
(.0131)
.99**
(.0129)
MALES

.98**
(.0219)
.86
(.1366)
.94*
(.0581)

.54*
(.0884)
.81***
(.0023)
.79***
(.0036)

.12
(.8022)
.46
(.3002)
.42
(.3505)

.05
(.9529)
.43
(.5684)
-.07
(.9272)

.99***
(.0065)
.93*
(.0730)
.12
(.8820)

.61**
(.0470)
.69**
(.0181)
.30
(.3638)

.17
(.7179)
.66
(.1066)

-.56
(.4409)
.94*
(.0602)
FEMALES

.88
(.1242)
.89
(.1054)

.54*
(.0843)
.77***
(.0053)

.48
(.2775)
.14
(.7572)
.68*
(.0945)

.71
(.2903)
.31
(.6896)
.59
(.4070)

.84
(.1595)
.84
(.1575)
-.39
(.6067)

.53*
(.0930)
.27
(.4172)
.27
(.4153)

.07
(.8793)
.69*
(.0858)

.02
(.9780)
.96**
(.0423)

.46
(.5376)
.72
(.2768)

.23
(.4897)
.71**
(.0147)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head
All youth
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 4.1 (cont’d)
Economic
Early PostEconomic
Expansion
Reform
Downturn
(1993-2000)
(1997-2000)
(2001-2004)
12 TO 14 YEAR OLDS

Total
(1993-2004)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

.83**
(.0222)
.09
(.8493)
.08
(.8570)
.34
(.4579)
.47
(.2850)

.66
(.3449)
.08
(.9166)
-.44
(.5609)
-.66
(.3420)
.86
(.1388)
15 to 17 YEAR OLDS

.98**
(.0163)
.99**
(.0141)
-.16
(.8356)

.77***
(.0051)
.60*
(.0515)
.16
(.6297)

.92*
(.0769)
.83
(.1663)

.54*
(.0849)
.68**
(.0214)

.99**
(.0123)
.82
(.1782)
-.19
(.8083)

.46
(.1553)
.50
(.1177)
.36
(.2772)

.99***
(.0054)
.85
(.1481)

.38
(.2494)
.77***
(.0054)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

-.53
(.2243)
.59
(.1621)
.89***
(.0078)
-.18
(.6970)
.66
(.1061)

.49
(.5129)
.68
(.3170)
.92*
(.0827)
-.23
(.7698)
.84
(.1639)
URBAN

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

.41
(.3614)
.56
(.1886)
.47
(.2877)

.00
(.9968)
.79
(.2091)
1.00***
(.0006)

.53
(.4663)
.95*
(.0531)
.35
(.6451)

.50
(.1210)
.76***
(.0062)
.49
(.1234)

.14
(.7602)
.76**
(.0483)

-.66
(.3422)
.93*
(.0721)

.74
(.2551)
.76
(.2449)

.40
(.2236)
.78***
(.0046)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 4.1 (cont’d)
Economic
Expansion
(1993-2000)

Early PostReform
(1997-2000)
NON-URBAN

Economic
Downturn
(2001-2004)

Total
(19932004)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Married couple
Female head

.40
(.3728)
.22
(.6347)
.18
(.7051)

.88
(.1228)
.07
(.9349)
-.76
(.2360)

.99**
(.0131)
.95**
(.0498)
-.67
(.3263)

.73**
(.0110)
.44
(.1697)
-.08
(.8258)

.15
(.7446)
.41
(.3595)

-.97**
(.0332)
.86
(.1433)

.95*
(.0551)
.93*
(.0666)

.55*
(.0814)
.72**
(.0128)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (Note: p-values in parentheses).
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Table 4.2
First Differenced Correlations of Group-Specific Youth Poverty and Violent
Victimization by Race, Ethnicity, and Family Structure
Economic
Expansion
(1993-2000)

Early PostReform
(1997-2000)
TOTAL SAMPLE

Economic
Downturn
(2001-2004)

Total
(19932004)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

.57
(.1790)
-.23
(.6186)
.54
(.2137)

.79
(.2139)
-.46
(.5389)
.81
(.1925)

.97**
(.0331)
.68
(.3220)
.59
(.4145)

.63**
(.0358)
.11
(.7516)
.46
(.1568)

.58
(.1723)
.45
(.3045)

-.07
(.9332)
.64
(.3570)
MALES

.78
(.2187)
.76
(.2399)

.71**
(.0131)
.49
(.1226)

.10
(.8260)
.03
(.9562)
.03
(.9513)

-.22
(.7808)
.11
(.8939)
-.26
(.7435)

.98**
(.0189)
.96**
(.0354)
.75
(.2540)

.67**
(.0249)
.45
(.1639)
.13
(.7062)

.47
(.2848)
.65
(.1134)

.13
(.8647)
.91*
(.0864)
FEMALES

.90
(.1013)
.94*
(.0558)

.68**
(.0219)
.71**
(.0154)

-.13
(.7736)
-.50
(.2555)
.59
(.1671)

-.21
(.7858)
-.80
(.1989)
.52
(.4827)

.74
(.2555)
-.06
(.9386)
.73
(.2732)

-.05
(.8927)
-.45
(.1624)
.56*
(.0730)

.47
(.2923)
.18
(.6936)

.42
(.5767)
.18
(.8177)

-.09
(.9042)
.29
(.7139)

.48
(.1358)
.18
(.5905)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
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Table 4.2 (cont’d)
Economic
Early PostExpansion
Reform
(1993-2000)
(1997-2000)
12 to 14 YEAR OLDS

Economic
Downturn
(2001-2004)

Total
(19932004)

.98**
(.0213)
.81
(.1905)
.38
(.6235)

.76***
(.0062)
.13
(.7075)
.08
(.8230)

.80
(.1953)
.64
(.3578)

.77***
(.0060)
.18
(.5920)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

.84**
(.0172)
-.26
(.5713)
-.06
(.8927)
.68*
(.0905)
.21
(.6473)

.73
(.2722)
-.28
(.7200)
.06
(.9364)
.25
(.7531)
.77
(.2346)
15 to 17 YEAR OLDS

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

-.41
(.3644)
-.51
(.2406)
.68*
(.0955)

.87
(.1322)
-.63
(.3652)
.25
(.7495)

.97**
(.0315)
-.22
(.7839)
.17
(.8235)

.31
(.3533)
-.43
(.1893)
.50
(.1195)

.11
(.8132)
.23
(.6230)

-.81
(.1820)
.11
(.8897)
URBAN

.01
(.9918)
.71
(.2891)

.25
(.4531)
.55
(.0808)

.50
(.2530)
-.11
(.8178)
-.04
(.9391)

.43
(.5669)
-.34
(.6559)
.69
(.3140)

.30
(.7015)
.15
(.8531)
.89
(.1104)

.16
(.6314)
.15
(.6493)
-.06
(.8608)

-.15
(.7478)
.66
(.1037)

-.10
(.9016)
.69
(.3087)

-.48
(.5162)
.59
(.4087)

.30
(.3667)
.62**
(.0418)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.101
Table 4.2 (cont’d)
Economic
Expansion
(1993-2000)

Early PostReform
(1997-2000)
NON-URBAN

Economic
Downturn
(2001-2004)

Total
(19932004)

Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Family Structure
Married couple
Female head

.25
(.5868)
-.01
(.9794)
.33
(.4692)

.63
(.3725)
-.40
(.5998)
.57
(.4333)

.91*
(.0899)
.91*
(.0914)
.58
(.4175)

.65**
(.0311)
.32
(.3316)
.37
(.2575)

.81**
(.0240)
.01
(.9849)

.37
(.6259)
.30
(.6997)

.94*
(.0641)
.82
(.1823)

.86***
(.0007)
.35
(.2872)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (Note: p-values in parentheses).
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The second criterion requires that there is a statistically significant association
between youth poverty and violent victimization as determined by first-differenced
correlation results. Because it is presumed that poverty is one of the key mechanisms
through which macroeconomic conditions and social policy changes influence youth
violence, a statistically nonsignificant relationship between poverty and violence trends
would constitute a ‘break’ in the chain of influence . For the purposes of this research,
then, a significant poverty-violence relationship is an essential component for the larger
association between macroeconomic conditions, welfare reform policies, and youth
violence trends. With these criteria in mind, the proposed poverty-violence relationship
will be assessed for racially disaggregated violence trends first followed by those
disaggregated by family structure.
The Influence of Macroeconomic Conditions and Welfare Reform Policies
Economic Expansion Period. The economic expansion contributed to substantial
reductions in child poverty from 1993 to 2000, but particularly for racial and ethnic
minorities. If the expansion contributed similarly to violent victimization trends, black
and Hispanic youth should also experience the most substantial reductions in violence
from 1993 to 2000, which is addressed by the following research question:
Research Question 1(a): Did youth violent victimization rates fall most
substantially for black and Hispanic youth during the economic expansion period
(i.e. 1993 to 2000)?
The first step towards answering this question is the calculation and comparison of the
1993-2000 violence reductions for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic
youth. In terms of percentage change, results show that rates of youth violent
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victimization fell by forty-seven percent for blacks and fifty percent for whites and
Hispanics. However, the differences in percentage points reveal that black youth
experienced the most substantial reductions (-78.57) followed by whites (-65.56) and
Hispanics (-61.99), which is inconsistent with the expected pattern. Hence, the
discrepant findings for Hispanic youth suggest that the economic expansion did not
influence violence reductions in the same manner that it influenced poverty.
Given the results for the entire study period, it is quite possible that the povertyviolence dynamic differs for Hispanic and non-Hispanic youth. Hence, the inconsistent
findings for Hispanic youth aside, it appears that violence fell more substantially for
black youth than white during the economic expansion period, which is consistent with
the reductions in child poverty. However, results from the correlation of first differences
reveal that poverty trends are not significantly associated with violence trends for nonHispanic white, non-Hispanic black, or Hispanic youth, which obviously disrupts the
presumed path from macroeconomic conditions to youth violence trends. Similar results
were also obtained for all youth sub-groups except younger white adolescents (r=.83,
p<.05) and older Hispanic adolescents (r=.89, p<.01), but violence reduction patterns
eliminate the possibility that the trends of older Hispanic adolescents were influenced by
the economic expansion.
It is important to note that the relationship between group-specific poverty and
violence was slightly stronger than that of total poverty and violence for whites (r=.57 vs.
r=.50), weaker for blacks (r=-.23 vs. r=.42), and about the same for Hispanics (r=.54 vs.
r=.55), although none were statistically significant. However, the general pattern across
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sub groups is that the total poverty-violence relationship is stronger than group-specific
poverty and violence, particularly for Hispanic youth.
Early Post-Reform Period. The early post-reform period was marked by a
distinct drop in poverty for all groups of children, but the largest overall reduction was
experienced by Hispanic youth. To determine the extent that violence trends replicated
post-reform patterns in poverty, the following research question is addressed:
Research Question 2(a): Did Hispanic youth experience the largest decrease in
violent victimization during the early post-reform period?
Estimates reveal that violent victimization fell by roughly one-third for non-black youth
and twenty-seven percent for black youth, which translates into reductions of thirty,
thirty-one, and thirty-three points for Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, and non-Hispanic
black youth respectively. Therefore, the straightforward answer to this question is ‘no’-not only did Hispanic youth fail to experience the largest overall reduction in violent
victimization during the early post-reform period, but they experienced the smallest
overall decrease. It is worth noting, however, that the magnitude of the violence
reductions differed very little between groups.
In addition to the inconsistencies between poverty and violence patterns, results
from first-differenced correlations reveal that total youth poverty is unrelated to violence
for all white (r=.63), black (r=.43), and Hispanic (r=.29) youth while marginally
statistically significant for older Hispanic youth (r=.92, p<.10) and urban residents
(r=1.00, p<.01). However, it is not likely that welfare reform influenced violence among
these two sub-groups as they did not experience the most substantial early post-reform
reductions in violence. In terms of the relationship between group-specific poverty and
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violence, results reveal a relatively stronger but statistically nonsignificant relationship
for white (r=.79), black (r= -.46), and Hispanic (r=.81) youth as well as nonsignificant
relationships across all sub-groups. Taken together, these findings suggest that welfare
reform did not influence violence trends via changes in total or group-specific poverty.
Economic Downturn Period. Over the course of the economic downturn period,
violence rates fell slowly for white and black youth from 2001 to 2003 and increased
slightly in 2004, which paralleled the trend in total youth poverty. So, it is not surprising
that first-differenced correlations reveal strong, statistically significant poverty-violence
associations for both white (r=.99, p<.05) and black (r=.96, p<.05) youth from 2001 to
2004, though it is important to keep in mind that the small number of data points weaken
the reliability of these estimates. Conversely, there was a weak, negative association for
non-Hispanic youth (r= -.16, ns), which is expected given the sharp drop in Hispanic
violence after 2002.
The association between group poverty and violent victimization was statistically
significant for the total sample of white youth only (r=.97, p<.05), although strong,
significant relationships were found for white and black males and non-urban residents as
well as white youth in both age groups. Again, the relationships between group-specific
poverty and violence were substantially weaker and statistically nonsignificant for all
sub-groups of Hispanic youth.
Because poverty is the presumed mechanism through which macroeconomic
conditions influence violence, it is safe to assume that the economic downturn did not
impact Hispanic youth violence. However, comparing the violence reductions of white
and black youth will shed some light on its influence on non-Hispanic youth violence.
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Because black children experienced the largest overall increase in poverty from 2001 to
2004, the following research question asks:
Research Question 3(a): Did black youth also experience the largest increase in
violent victimization during the weak economic conditions of the early 2000s?
For blacks, average rates of youth violent victimization rose from 56.71 per 1,000 in
2001 to 57.28 per 1,000 in 2004, a nominal increase of less than one percentage point
(+0.57). In comparison, white rates fell from 57.69 per 1,000 in 2001 to 56.03 per 1,000
in 2004--a decrease of almost two percentage points. By virtue of this decrease, then,
black youth experienced the largest overall increase in violence from 2001 to 2004,
which is consistent with the expected pattern. Coupled with the statistically significant
association between total poverty and violence, these findings suggest that the economic
downturn influenced black violence trends.
For one sub-group--males--there was not only a strong, statistically significant
association between total poverty and violent victimization, but white and black youth
both experienced increases in violence from 2001 to 2004. In fact, the increase in
percentage points for black males (+18.94) was more than 2.5 times larger than the
increase for white males (+6.94), which suggests that the economic downturn influenced
the violence trends of these two sub-groups via total youth poverty. For the same reasons,
moreover, the economic downturn also appears to have influenced white and black male
violence trends via group-specific poverty.
Summary. A large body of findings for racial and ethnic youth has been
discussed, revealing several noteworthy patterns in the poverty-violence relationship.
One is that the relationship between poverty and violence is not statistically significant

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.107
across the majority of categories. Of the 28 total poverty-violence relationships assessed
for each group, 11 or 39% reached statistical significance for non-Hispanic whites, 9 or
32% for non-Hispanic blacks, and 4 or 14% for Hispanics. Even fewer relationships were
statistically significant for group-specific poverty: 10 out of 28 (36%) for non-Hispanic
whites, 2 out of 28 (7%) for non-Hispanic blacks, and 2 out of 28 (7%) for Hispanics,
which coupled with the fact that the group poverty relationships were relatively weaker
suggests that the more significant relationship was that of total poverty and violent
victimization. When a large number of relationships are assessed, however, it is
important for readers to observe the possibility that some are statistically significant by
chance. Hence, the number of significant correlations is noted primarily for descriptive
purposes and is less consequential to the findings than larger patterns in the povertyviolence relationship.
Important differences in the poverty-violence relationships of Hispanic and nonHispanic youth were also consistently found. In addition to fewer statistically significant
relationships, first-differenced correlations were substantially weaker than that of nonHispanic youth more often that not. Moreover, trends disaggregated by race and ethnicity
reveal a marked reduction in Hispanic youth violence in the early 2000s that contrasts
with converging trends among non-Hispanic youth; this marked reduction was observed
not only for the total sample of Hispanic youth but across every Hispanic sub-group.
Additional analyses identified trends in simple and aggravated assault as likely
contributors, but the reasons behind the declines are unknown.
It is not surprising, then, that macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform
policies did not influence Hispanic violence trends. Based on the established criteria,
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however, the economic expansion does emerge as a plausible contributor to the violence
trends of non-Hispanic white younger adolescents via total poverty and the economic
downturn to black youth violence trends via total youth poverty as well as white and
black male violence trends via total and group-specific poverty; no significant effects
emerged during the early post-reform period.
Violence trends by family structure
General patterns, 1993-2004
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 display the trends in total and group-specific poverty and
violent victimization disaggregated by family structure and clearly shows that youth in
female-headed families experience higher average victimization rates than youth in
married couple families. In 1993, the average victimization rate for youth in femaleheaded families (165.61 per 1,000) was nearly 150% of the rate for youth in married
couple families (110.64 per 1,000), the former increasing to nearly 195% of the latter by
the end of the series. In contrast to the racial and ethnic gaps in violent victimization, the
current trends do not narrow or widen noticeably at any point during the series. Instead it
is poised at a roughly one and one-half to two-fold gap each year.
During the economic expansion period, youth in both female-headed and married
couple families experienced sharp declines in violent victimization that outpaced that of
total and group-specific poverty. While average poverty rates fell by twenty-one and
twenty percent for all youth and youth in female-headed families respectively, violent
victimization rates fell by more than forty-seven percent for the latter group. In
comparison, youth in married couple families experienced poverty and violent
victimization declines of roughly twenty-four and fifty-one percent respectively.
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Figure 4.8
Total youth poverty and violent victimization rates by family structure, 1993-2004
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Figure 4.9
Group-specific poverty and violent victimization rates by family structure, 1993-2004
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Throughout the early post-reform period, violent victimization rates fell steadily
for youth in married couple families but after slowing somewhat in 1997, rates fell
markedly for youth in female-headed families--the latter coinciding with a slight
acceleration in the total poverty decline. Similar violence patterns were also observed for
sub-groups of youth in married couple and female-headed families, with particularly
striking post-TANF declines for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth in femaleheaded families (see Appendices I-N).
The 2001 recession marked an increase in violent victimization for youth in
female-headed families, though rates fluctuated from year to year thereafter. The same
general pattern was also observed for all subgroups of youth in female-headed families
with the exception of females, whose rates declined throughout the economic downturn
period. Violence also declined steadily for youth in married couple families, but
stabilized in 2004. However, there was greater variation in sub-group trends relative to
youth in female-headed families. While younger adolescent and non-urban trends
mirrored those for all youth in married couple families, the violence decline continued
noticeably throughout 2004 for females and older adolescents. Coupled with the findings
for race and ethnicity, then, it is apparent that downturn-era violence declined rather
substantially for females. For males and urban youth in married couple families, violence
stabilized in 2001 and increased in 2004, respectively.
Over the entire study period, there was a moderate association between total
poverty and violent victimization for youth in married couple families (r=.54, p<.10)
which was weaker than the association between group-specific poverty and violence
(r=.71, p<.05). For youth in female-headed families, the reverse was true: the association

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.112
between total poverty and violent victimization (r=.81, p<.01) was stronger than that
between group-specific poverty and violence (r=.49, ns). These patterns reflect a larger
trend of stronger group poverty-violence relationships for sub-groups of youth in married
couple families and stronger total poverty-violence relationships among groups of youth
in female-headed families.
Economic Expansion Period. The economic expansion contributed to substantial
reductions in poverty for all family groups, but particularly for female-headed families. If
it also contributed to violence trends, youth in female-headed families would also
experience more substantial reductions in violence than youth in married couple families,
which is reflected in the following research question:
Research Question 1(b): Did youth in female-headed families experience a
more substantial decrease in violent victimization than youth in married couple
families during the economic expansion?
Estimates reveal that the straightforward answer to this question is ‘yes’. Between 1993
and 2000, violence fell by roughly fifty-one and forty-seven percent for youth in married
couple and female-headed families, which translates to percentage point reductions of
fifty-six and seventy-nine points, respectively. Consistent with expected patterns, then,
violence fell more substantially for youth in female-headed families than youth in
married couple families over the economic expansion period.
Despite the symmetry between poverty and violence patterns, however, results
from first-differenced correlations suggest that the expansion’s influence on violence
trends is limited to youth in female-headed families via total poverty (r=.73, p<.10),
although the relationship was only marginally statistically significant. For girls in female-

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.113
headed families, the significant total poverty-violence relationship and violence reduction
pattern also suggests that the economic expansion contributed to female violence trends
but again, the relationship was significant at α=.10. There was also a significant total
poverty-violence association for urban youth in female-headed families (r=.76, p<.05),
but the violence reduction patterns are inconsistent with an ‘expansion effect’. Urban
youth in married couple families experienced a 1993-2000 violence reduction of nearly
82 points while those in female-headed families experienced a 77-point reduction.
There was a statistically significant association between group-specific poverty
and violent victimization for younger adolescents (r=.68, p<.10) and non-urban youth
(r=.81, p<.05) in married couple families, with both experiencing substantially smaller
violence reductions than their counterparts in female-headed families. Taken together,
these findings also suggest that the economic expansion may have indirectly influenced
these violence trends via group-specific poverty rates.
Early Post-Reform Period. Because there is an overlap between the late
economic expansion and early post-reform periods, it is not possible to isolate the effects
of each on violent victimization trends. Nonetheless, the general patterns hint that this
period is important for total poverty and violence reductions for youth in female-headed
families because they appear to accelerate as the expansion gained momentum and TANF
effectively replaced AFDC. Accelerated reductions were also generally observed in the
group-specific poverty and violent victimization trends of youth sub-groups in femaleheaded families, although similar patterns were not observed for those in married couple
families.
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According to results from the correlation of first differences, the relationship
between total poverty and violent victimization was statistically significant not only for
all youth in married couple (r=-.99, p<.01) and female-headed families (r=.99, p<.01) but
for males (r=.94, p<.10), females (r=.96, p<.05), and urban youth (r=.93, p<.10) in
female-headed families, and non-urban youth in married couple families (r=-.97, p<.05).
Conversely, the relationship between group-specific poverty and violence was
statistically significant for males in female-headed families only (r=.91, p<.10), which
clearly suggests that the total poverty-violence relationship is more important than the
group poverty-violence relationship.
The significant associations between poverty and violence cautiously established,
the next step towards determining potential TANF effects is to estimate and compare the
violence reductions of each group; because children in female-headed families
experienced larger post-reform poverty reductions than children in married couple
families, the following research question asks whether violence reductions followed the
same pattern:
Research Question 2(b): Did youth in female-headed families also experience the
largest decrease in violent victimization during this time?
From 1997 to 2000, violence rates fell from 79.21 per 1,000 to 54.68 per 1,000 for
all youth in married couple families, a reduction of about thirty-one percent or twentyfive percentage points. Rates also fell by about thirty-two percent or forty-two percentage
points for youth in female-headed families, from 127.83 per 1,000 in 1997 to 87.04 per
1,000 in 2000. The same pattern was observed across all sub-groups, which means that
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for all groups that experienced significant poverty-violence relationships, there is a
reduction in violence that follows the post-reform pattern in poverty reductions.
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that TANF implementation contributed to the
violent victimization trends of all youth in married couple and female-headed families,
non-urban youth in married couple families and males, females, and urban youth in
female-headed families via total youth poverty. Also by way of group-poverty, TANF
appears to have some indirect influence on violence among males in female-headed
families.
Economic Downturn Period. To briefly review, the 2001-2004 violent
victimization trends followed very different patterns for the two groups of youth. For
those in married couple families, the decline in violent victimization persisted throughout
the end of the series, stabilizing somewhat in 2004. This pattern was also observed in the
violence trends of younger adolescents, older adolescents, and non-urban youth in
married couple families, all of which were closely associated with trends in total poverty
(see Table 4.1). For only one sub-group, non-urban youth, was there a significant
association between group-specific poverty and violent victimization, however (r=.94,
p<.10).
Violence rates for youth in female-headed families decreased in 2001, increased
in 2002, decreased in 2003, and increased again in 2004, following no clear pattern.
However, this period witnessed an aggregate violence increase of about four points,
which is also reflected in the violence patterns of males, younger and older adolescents,
and urban and non-urban youth in female-headed families, although the increase was
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much larger for males (+25.92) and older adolescents (+17.60). Only for girls in femaleheaded families was there an aggregate decrease in violence during this time.
To determine whether the economic downturn influenced these trends, the
following research question is addressed:
Research Question 3(b): Did youth in female-headed families experience the
largest increase in violent victimization during the economic downturn period?
Unlike previous sections, answering this question does not require comparing the
magnitude of group violence increases for one reason: for all youth in married couple
families and every sub-group, there was an aggregate decrease in violent victimization
from 2001 to 2004. So regardless of the statistical significance of the various povertyviolence relationships, these contradictory patterns suggest that the economic downturn
did not influence the violence trends of youth in married couple families.
With the exception of girls in female-headed families, on the other hand, all youth
in female-headed families and every sub-group experienced an aggregate increase in
violent victimization over the economic downturn period. However, first-differenced
correlations show that the total poverty-violence relationship is significant for only nonurban youth in female-headed families (r=.93, p<.10) and the group poverty-violence for
males (r=.94, p<.10), pointing to the economic downturn as a plausible contributor to
these trends.
Summary. When trends are disaggregated by family structure, it is evident that
the total poverty-violence relationship is more important for youth in female-headed
families than married couple families, both in terms of the relative strength of the
relationships and the number of statistically significant findings. Of the 28 total poverty-
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violence relationships assessed, 15 or 54% reached statistical significance for groups of
youth in female-headed families, which is greater than any other group. In comparison,
10 or 36% were significant for groups of youth in married couple families, which falls
between non-Hispanic whites (39%) and non-Hispanic blacks (32%). Overall, the total
poverty-violence relationship is least likely to be significant for Hispanic youth (14%).
On the other hand, the group poverty-violence relationship for youth in married
couple families was both relatively stronger and more likely to be significant than that of
youth in female-headed families. However, the relationship between group poverty and
violence was less likely to reach statistical significance than that of total poverty and
violence for both groups. Of the 28 relationships assessed, only 4 (14%) were significant
for youth in female-headed families and 7 (25%) for youth in married couple families, the
latter being second only to non-Hispanic whites.
In terms of the influence of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform
policies on the poverty-violence relationship, the effects appear more salient for family
rather than racial groups. Where only the economic downturn contributed to the violence
trends of non-Hispanic blacks via total youth poverty and non-Hispanic whites and blacks
via total and group-specific poverty, it contributed to the violence trends of non-urban
youth in female-headed families via total poverty and males in female-headed families
via group poverty. However, the economic expansion also contributed to violence trends
for females and all youth in female-headed families and younger adolescents and nonurban youth in married couple families via total and group-specific poverty, respectively.
Additionally, the early post-reform period, which encompasses TANF implementation
and the latter half of the economic expansion, contributed to violence trends for all youth
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in married couple and female-headed families, non-urban youth in married couple
families, and males, females, and urban youth in female-headed families (total poverty),
as well as males in female-headed families (group-specific poverty). Table 4.3
summarizes these findings for racial/ethnic and family groups.
These findings suggest that the impact of macroeconomic conditions and welfare
reform policies on violence trends is more apparent for family rather than racial groups,
particularly in regards to the early post-reform findings for youth in female-headed
families. For no other time period is there more affirmative evidence that ‘female-headed
family’ youth violence is influenced by larger economic or social effects than the early
post-reform period. This finding is important because female-headed families comprise
the overwhelming majority of welfare cases and if TANF had any immediate effects on
violence trends, they would probably be most evident for youth in female-headed
families.
Summary
The preceding discussion reveals that there is an important link between youth
poverty and violent victimization that varies widely across demographic groups, poverty
measures, and time periods--providing important answers to secondary research
questions. As such, this section will serve as an overall summary of key findings and
important patterns in the poverty-violence relationship as they relate to the secondary
research questions, beginning with the following question:
Are there significant sub-group differences in the poverty-youth violence
relationship?
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Table 4.3
Summary of Significant Findings for Macroeconomic Conditions and Welfare Reform
Policies on Poverty-Violence Relationships
Economic Expansion Period
Total poverty-violence
 Non-Hispanic white younger adolescents
 All youth in female-headed families
 Females in female-headed families
Group poverty-violence
 Younger adolescents in married couple families
 Non-urban youth in married couple families
Early Post-Reform Period
Total poverty-violence
 All youth in married couple families
 Non-urban youth in married couple families
 All youth in female-headed families
 Males in female-headed families
 Females in female-headed families
 Urban youth in female-headed families
Group poverty-violence
 Males in female-headed families
Economic Downturn Period
Total poverty-violence
 All non-Hispanic black youth
 Non-Hispanic white males
 Non-Hispanic black males
 Non-urban youth in female-headed families
Group poverty-violence
 Non-Hispanic white males
 Non-Hispanic black males
 Males in female-headed families

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.120
Across the categories of gender, age, and metropolitan status, the overall
relationship between poverty and violent victimization was stronger for non-Hispanic
whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youth in female-headed families than Hispanics and
youth in married couple families, and more likely to be statistically significant. For only
two sub-groups of racial and ethnic youth was the poverty-violence relationship fairly
strong and statistically significant for both white and black youth: males and younger
adolescents. However, the strongest overall relationships were found for white younger
adolescents (r=.77, p<.01), black urban youth (r=.76, p<.01), and white non-urban youth
(r=.73, p<.05).
When trends were disaggregated by family structure, significant poverty-violence
associations were found for males, younger adolescents, and non-urban youth in both
married couple and female-headed families and for all of these groups, the relationships
were stronger for youth in female-headed vis-à-vis married couple families. In fact, there
was virtually no variation in the magnitude of the relationships for the married couple
family sub-groups; the relationships were moderately strong and marginally significant
for males (r=.54, p<10), younger adolescents (r=.54, p<.10), non-urban youth (r=.55,
p<.10), and all youth in married couple families (r=.54, p<.10). The corresponding
relationships for the female-headed family groups were fairly strong for males (r=.77,
p<.01), younger adolescents (r=.68, p<.05), and non-urban youth (r=.72, p<.05), although
these relationships also do not vary substantially.
Clearly, the sum of the evidence suggests that the overall relationship between
poverty and violent victimization is more important for some sub-groups of youth than
others. More specifically, it appears to be most significant for males and younger
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adolescents, for which moderate to strong and statistically significant relationships were
found for every group except Hispanic youth; significant relationships were also found
for non-urban youth in both married couple and female-headed families.
The next research question is concerned with whether group violence trends are
more closely related to group vis-à-vis total youth poverty trends, presuming that the
greater impact will come from the more proximate poverty measure:
Are group-specific changes in youth poverty more closely related to groupspecific youth violent victimization trends than changes in the overall youth
poverty rate?
As previously noted, there were far fewer statistically significant group povertyviolence relationships relative to total poverty-violence for all groups of youth, which
also tended to be weaker in magnitude. Between 1993 and 2004, in fact, there were no
significant group poverty-violence associations for neither the total sample of nonHispanic black and Hispanic youths or any sub-groups with the exception of a
moderately strong and marginally significant association for Hispanic females; there were
only four groups of non-Hispanic whites for which significant overall associations were
found: all youth (r=.63, p<.05), males (r=.67, p<.05), younger adolescents (r=.76,
p<.01), and non-urban youth (r=.65, p<.05)--the same groups for which significant total
poverty-violence relationships were found. So regardless of measurement, poverty trends
appear to be significantly related to violence trends for all non-Hispanic white youth as
well as males, younger adolescents, and non-urban residents.
In terms of the relative strength of the overall relationships, total poverty-violence
also tended to be stronger in magnitude than group poverty-violence for both non-
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Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black youth. Conversely, group poverty-violence
tended to be the stronger relationship for Hispanic youth. Of the seven groups assessed
(i.e. total sample of youth and six sub-groups), one category each of non-Hispanic whites
and non-Hispanic blacks yielded stronger group poverty-violence relationships while
stronger relationships were found for four categories of Hispanic youth.
It is important to note that there are important similarities and differences in the
findings for non-Hispanic white youth and those in married couple families. As was the
case with white youth, poverty was significantly associated with violence trends for all
youth in married couple families and males, younger adolescents, and non-urban youth,
regardless of measurement. Unlike white youth, on the other hand, group poverty was
more strongly associated with violence than total poverty for each of the above groups.
Across all groups of youth in female-headed families, the group poverty-violence
relationship was relatively weaker than that of total poverty and violence, but violence
was significantly associated with both total and group poverty for males and urban youth
only. Therefore, the sum of the evidence suggests that violence was more closely
associated with total poverty for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youths in
female-headed families while the reverse tended to be true for Hispanics and youths in
married couple families. Regardless of the measure used, however, poverty trends were
not significantly associated with Hispanic youth violence trends over the twelve years in
the sample.
In addition to sub-group differences in the poverty-violence relationship and the
relative impact of global and proximate poverty measures on violence trends, an
additional concern of this research is the general differences in the relationships of the
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economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods, as addressed in
the following research question:
Are there significant differences between the poverty-youth violence relationships
of the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic downturn periods?
According to results for the overall relationships, the strongest association was
found for the early post-reform period followed by the economic downturn and economic
expansion periods. When results are compared across all sub-groups, however, a clear
pattern emerges: the strongest total poverty-violence and group poverty-violence
associations are found during the economic downturn period. Despite being strong in
magnitude, however, the associations were not statistically significant for several groups
including males in married couple families, non-Hispanic white females, and all youth in
female-headed families.
This pattern does not hold up for Hispanic youth. For males, females, and all
Hispanic youth, the strongest ‘total poverty’ relationship was found during the economic
expansion period while for younger adolescents, older adolescents, urban, and non-urban
youth, it was strongest during the early post-reform period. However, the ‘group poverty’
relationship did appear to be strongest for the majority of Hispanic sub-groups during the
economic downturn period. The other notable exception is female-headed families. For
the total sample and every sub-group except non-urban youth, the relationship between
total poverty and violence was strongest for the early post-reform period. There is less
consistency in the findings for group-specific poverty, but across the majority of
categories, the strongest relationship was found during the economic downturn period.
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Overall, the relationship between poverty and violence appears to be stronger
during the economic downturn than any other period, although for youth in femaleheaded families and more than half of the Hispanic sub-groups, the strongest
relationships were found during the early post reform period--the two groups that
experienced the most prominent declines in family and child poverty in the immediate
wake of TANF. However, it is important to remember that these relationships were not
significant for Hispanic youth.
Additional analyses (not shown) were also conducted, extending the post-reform
period to the end of the series. First-differenced correlations were then estimated preTANF (i.e. 1993-1997) and post-TANF (i.e. 1997-2004) in an attempt to gauge the
general differences in the poverty-violence relationship of each group before and after
welfare reform. Despite the fact that the pre-TANF period consists of only five data
points and thus is prone to producing high correlations, the results show that the postTANF relationship between total poverty and violent victimization is substantially
stronger (and statistically significant) for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and
youths in female-headed families compared to the pre-TANF relationship. The pre-TANF
relationship was moderately and substantially stronger than the post-TANF relationship
for Hispanics and youths in married couple families respectively, which obviously stands
in stark contrast to patterns observed for non-Hispanics and youths in female-headed
families and offers further evidence of important differences in the poverty-violence
dynamic of Hispanic youth. Moreover, these findings hint at important differences in the
poverty-violence relationship before and after the implementation of TANF. The
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following chapter explores whether youth’s risks for violence have also changed over
recent decades, and whether these changes are associated with TANF.
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CHAPTER 5
MICRO-LEVEL ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND FINDINGS
The macro-level analysis identified some important patterns in the povertyviolence relationship. First, it confirmed a significant association between youth poverty
and violence trends from 1993 to 2004, not only for the total sample of youth but for nonHispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youths in both married couple and femaleheaded families. Second, the significance of the overall poverty-violence relationship
varied across demographic sub-groups, with male, younger adolescent, and non-urban
groups being more likely to experience significant relationships. Third, there are
substantive differences in the poverty-violence relationships of Hispanic and nonHispanic youth--Hispanic relationships tending not only to be substantially weaker than
non-Hispanic relationships but overwhelmingly statistically nonsignificant.
Finally, there are pre-post TANF differences in the poverty-violence relationship,
particularly for non-Hispanic youth and those in female-headed families. For these
groups, post-TANF relationships were strong in magnitude and highly statistically
significant while the pre-TANF relationships were weak in magnitude and highly
statistically nonsignificant, particularly for non-Hispanic whites and blacks; both pre- and
post-TANF relationships were strong for youth in female-headed families, but only the
post-TANF relationship was statistically significant. These findings are important
because they hint that TANF did impact the consequences of poverty for violence among
certain groups of youth. Also, when the relationships between poverty and violence
trends were assessed for the economic expansion, early post-reform, and economic
downturn periods, results suggest that TANF plausibly contributed to violence trends for
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non-urban and all youth in married couple families and males, females, urban, and all
youth in female-headed families. Thus, family structure appears to be an important
contingency in the poverty-violence relationship, particularly in the wake of welfare
reform.
With pre-post TANF differences in the poverty-violence relationship already
established, the broad objective of the micro-level analysis is to assess whether the
consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks have also changed in recent decades
and whether these changes are associated with the mandatory work requirements enacted
by TANF; based on recent trends in the percentage of poor children in working poor
families, more specifically, it is presumed that the consequences of poverty for youth’s
violence risks will be exacerbated in the immediate wake of welfare reform and
diminished over the long-run, if welfare reform indeed had any impact. In light of
findings from the macro-level analysis, however, it is also important to consider how
family structure has affected the relationship between poverty and youth’s violence risks
before and after TANF implementation.
Analytic Strategy
Pursuant to these objective, survey weighted logistic regression analyses will be
conducted for the years 19933 to 2004. The initial strategy employed yearly analyses to
determine the changing nature of the poverty-violence relationship over time. For a
couple of reasons, however, the data will be pooled into three distinct time periods: preTANF (i.e. 1993-1996), early post-TANF (i.e. 1997-2000), and late post-TANF (i.e.
2001-2004). First, pooling the data will allow for more efficient analyses. Second, more

3

The first two quarters of the 1993 NCVS were omitted from the analysis due to the exclusion of one of
the essential sampling weights--v2118.
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substantive meaning can be drawn from patterns observed over the three time periods
than yearly changes in the poverty-violence relationship. Last, the specified time periods
lend themselves well to the determination of whether TANF exacerbated the consequence
of poverty for youth’s violence risks in the immediate wake of implementation (i.e. 19972000) relative to before (i.e. 1993-1996), and whether this consequence diminished in the
long-run according to expected findings.
Due to its ability to correct standard errors for clustering, Stata 9.2 is used to
conduct the analyses. Also due to memory limitations, however, Stata could not handle a
large dataset consisting of all 1993-2004 NCVS files. Instead, three separate datasets
were created by merging 1993-1996 into ‘pre-TANF’, 1997-2000 into early post-TANF,
and 2001-2004 into late post-TANF. In each dataset, a baseline model is first established
regressing youth’s violent victimization risks on the poverty status variable. Next,
race/ethnicity and family structure variables are added to the model to assess the
consequences of poverty for youth violence risks net of important demographic
predictors. Finally, gender and metropolitan status are added to the model as additional
controls. Because it is unimportant for youth’s violence risks, the age variable is omitted
from the analysis.
In addition to the outcome variable (i.e. whether or not youth experienced a
violent victimization incident), all of the explanatory variables are dummy coded (see
Chapter 3 for a review of coding schemes). The only exception is the ‘race and ethnicity’
measure, which was originally coded into three distinct categories: non-Hispanic white,
non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic youth. The advantage of combining the race and
ethnicity categories as such is that it produces more accurate estimates of group violence
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risks. Because Hispanics are commonly lumped into ‘white’ race categories, for example,
stark black-white comparisons will serve to inflate ‘white’ violence risks. This
classification scheme overcomes this problem by separating whites and Hispanics.
However, an obvious disadvantage of employing a three-category race and ethnicity
variable in a logistic regression analysis is that the coefficients cannot be interpreted in
terms of group differences in risks, so the race and ethnicity measure was transformed
from its original form into a series of three dummy-coded variables: non-Hispanic white
(0=‘no’, 1=‘yes’); non-Hispanic black (0=‘no’, 1=‘yes’), and Hispanic (0=‘no’, ‘1=yes’).
Of these three variables, ‘non-Hispanic black’ and ‘Hispanic’ are included in the analysis
to assess the differences in youth’s violence risks between these two groups and nonHispanic whites.
One issue of concern with the explanatory variables is multicollinearity, which
occurs when two or more are strongly inter-related. Generally speaking, multicollinearity
makes it difficult to obtain an unbiased estimate of the distinct effect of each explanatory
variable on the outcome of interest but more specifically, it may serve to inflate standard
errors, which in turn decreases the likelihood of obtaining statistically significant
coefficients (Allison, 1999).
To test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, a bivariate
correlation matrix was estimated (not shown) and results reveal that none are strongly
associated. The largest in magnitude pre-, early, and late post-TANF, the association
between ‘female-headed family’ and ‘poverty’ was .34, .35, and .31 for each of the
respective periods, which suggests that multicollinearity is a non-issue. However, it is
important to note that the bivariate correlation is a conservative test. Considered more
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superior alternatives to the bivariate correlation matrix, VIF and tolerance statistics were
also estimated as additional tests for multicollinearity. Again, results revealed mean
VIF’s of 1.16 for the five explanatory variables and tolerances that ranged from a
minimum of .79 (poverty) to a maximum of 1.00 (gender) for the pre-reform, early postreform, and late post-reform periods, which further rules out high collinearity between
the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity is generally a concern when VIF and
tolerance values exceed 10 or fall below 0.1 (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, & Wells, 2003),
although Allison (1999) suggests that respective values above 2.5 and below .40 may
indicate a problem in logistic regression analyses. Descriptive statistics for all
explanatory variables are presented in Table 5.1.
Results
Table 5.2 displays the baseline model regressing youth’s risk for violence on
poverty for the pre-TANF, early post-TANF, and late post-TANF periods. The results
show that there is a direct, statistically significant relationship between poverty and
violence for each period and the sign of the coefficients suggest that poor youth are
significantly more likely than non-poor youth to experience violence. To better gauge the
strength of this association, coefficients are exponentiated to obtain the odds ratios; in
this case, the odds ratio simply reflects the ratio of the odds of violent victimization
occurring in poor vs. non-poor youth. Results reveal that the odds of violence associated
with poverty are not particularly substantial. When the coefficients are exponentiated, the
odds for poor youth are 1.14, 1.36, and 1.29 times larger than those for non-poor youth
during the pre-, early, and late post-TANF periods, respectively.
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Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics for Logistic Regression Explanatory Variables a,b
Pre-reform Early post-reform Late post-reform
Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Mean S.E.
At/Below Poverty

.23

.006

.21

.008

.19

.008

Non-Hispanic Black

.16

.007

.16

.010

.15

.010

Hispanic

.13

.009

.15

.013

.18

.015

Female-headed Family

.24

.005

.26

.007

.27

.006

Male

.51

.004

.51

.004

.51

.005

Urban

.26

.012

.26

.016

.27

.016

a
b

Variable names reflect reference categories.
Descriptive statistics are survey weighted to reflect sample design characteristics.
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Table 5.2
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status
Pre-TANF
Poverty
Constant
Model F-Statistic

.127*

Early Post-TANF

Late Post-TANF

(.064)

.306*** (.079)

.256** (.098)

-3.032*** (.033)

-3.402*** (.044)

-3.803*** (.052)

3.94*

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

15.23***

6.87**
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It also appears that the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks do
strengthen during the early post-TANF period (i.e. relative to pre-TANF) and weaken
during the late post-TANF period (i.e. relative to early post), which is consonant with
expected findings that the mandatory work requirements legislated by PRWORA and
implemented by TANF exacerbated the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence
risks during the early post-reform period and diminished over the long-run, presumably
as parents cultivated the necessary skills and experience to secure better paying jobs with
more benefits. However, only the increase between the pre- and early post-TANF periods
is statistically significant.4
Another pattern from the baseline model worth noting is that the odds of violent
victimization associated with poverty increased more substantially in the wake of TANF
than decreased over the long-run. Between the pre-reform and early post-reform periods,
more specifically, odds increased by nineteen percent and decreased by only five percent
between the early and late post-reform periods, the former being more than three times
larger than the latter. This pattern suggests that while TANF immediately exacerbated the
consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks, it failed to affect a significant
reduction in these consequences over the long-run.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the odds ratios are not sizeable, with
the odds of violence for poor youth being less than two times larger than the odds for
non-poor youth each period. Given that children in working poor families comprised a
little more than one-third of all children in poor families in 1997 and greater than onehalf in 2004 (Wertheimer, Moore, and Burkhauser, 2008), one would expect TANF to
influence more substantial changes in the odds ratio. Hence, it is not likely that TANF
4

(z=1.76, p<.10)
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contributed to the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence, despite the
fact that it adhered to the hypothesized manner.
Still, it is important to consider how the covariates of race, ethnicity, and family
structure affect the poverty-violence relationship, particularly in light of the macro-level
findings that the relationship between poverty and violence trends did vary considerably
by race, ethnicity, and family structure--the latter emerging as the most important
contingency in the relationship. Will family structure also emerge as an important
contingency in the poverty-violence relationship at the micro-level? Are race and
ethnicity also important contingencies? To answer these questions, Model 2 adds ‘nonHispanic black’, ‘Hispanic’, and ‘female-headed family’ variables to the baseline model
and results are presented in Table 5.3.
In terms of the relationship between race, ethnicity, and youth’s risks for violence,
the magnitude and sign of the coefficients suggests that both non-Hispanic blacks and
Hispanics are slightly less likely than non-Hispanic whites to experience violence each
period. With the exception of the late post-reform Hispanic coefficient, however, none of
the relationships were statistically significant. Net of poverty and family structure, then,
there were no pre-reform and early post-reform relationships between race, ethnicity, and
violence risks, but Hispanic youth were about 1.45 times less likely than non-Hispanic
white youth to experience violent victimization between 2001 and 2004; race and
ethnicity variables also failed to exert significant direct effects on youth’s violence risks
(not shown) each period, save that of the late post-reform Hispanic coefficient.
Conversely, family structure is significantly related to violence risks both directly
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Table 5.3
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status, Race and
Ethnicity, and Family Structure
Pre-TANF
Poverty

Early Post-TANF

Late Post-TANF

.018

(.072)

.160

(.093)

.127

(.107)

Non-Hispanic Black

-.147

(.097)

-.128

(.100)

-.162

(.122)

Hispanic

-.106

(.089)

-.164

(.108)

-.375***(.112)

Female-headed Family .485*** (.064)
Constant
Model F-Statistic

-3.106*** (.039)
16.06***

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

.502*** (.064)

.653*** (.097)

-3.480*** (.056)

-3.906*** (.060)

20.34***

17.42***
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(not shown) and net of poverty, race, and ethnicity for the pre-reform, early post-reform,
and late post-reform periods. More specifically, the results suggest that youth in femaleheaded families are more likely than youth in married couple families to experience
violence and this likelihood appears to have increased over time. The exponentiated
coefficients show that the odds of violent victimization for youth in female-headed
families were 1.62 and 1.65 times larger than the odds for youth in married couple
families, increasing by roughly two percent over the pre-reform and early post-reform
periods. Conversely, odds increased sixteen percent to 1.92 over the early and late postreform periods, seeming to suggest increasing post-reform consequences of femaleheaded families for youth’s violence risks. However, these post-reform changes in the
family structure effect were not significant.
More important than the relationship between family structure and violence is the
assessment of how race, ethnicity, and family structure affect the poverty-violence
relationship. When these variables are introduced into the model, one of the most
apparent differences in the poverty coefficient is the change in magnitude, which
declined eighty-six, forty-eight, and fifty percent during the pre-reform, early postreform, and late post-reform period, respectively. But despite these reductions, the
changes in the poverty-violence relationship still conform to the hypothesized pattern of
strengthening early post-reform and weakening thereafter.
Despite this consistency with expected patterns, however, the most important
change in the poverty-violence relationship net of race, ethnicity, and family structure is
that it is no longer statistically significant. For each period, the family structure variable
fully mediates the relationship between poverty and violence, which essentially means
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that poverty loses its ability to predict youth’s violence risks once family structure is
accounted for. It appears, then, that family structure is the underlying mechanism that is
responsible for the relationship between poverty and violence risks, and more
specifically, living in a female-headed family. These results are consistent with macrolevel findings that identify family structure as an important contingency in the
relationship between youth poverty and violent victimization trends.
Family structure is clearly an important predictor of violence risks net of poverty,
race, and ethnicity, but it is also important to consider the impact of the demographic
controls of gender and metropolitan status on both the family structure-violence and
poverty-violence relationships. While research has firmly established that male and urban
youth are at greater risk for violence than their female and non-urban counterparts, the
following questions are of particular concern of this analysis: Will the introduction of
gender and metropolitan status improve or worsen poverty’s ability to predict youth
violence risks? Will family structure also emerge as the most important predictor of
violence risks net of the additional controls? The full model presented in Table 5.4
addresses these questions.
Although the relative impact of gender and metropolitan status on violence risks
is not the focal concern of this analysis, they are worth noting. The results show that
gender is significantly related to violence risks in the expected direction. That is, males
are more likely than females to experience violence each period, though not substantially
so; when the coefficients are exponentiated, the odds of violence for males are 1.74 times
larger than females prior to TANF, 1.52 in the immediate wake of TANF, and 1.61
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Table 5.4
Logistic Regression Analysis of Youth’s Risk for Violence on Poverty Status, Race and
Ethnicity, Family Structure, and Demographic Controls
Pre-TANF
Poverty

.011

(.072)

Early Post-TANF

Late Post-TANF

.152

(.092)

.100

(.109)
(.123)

Non-Hispanic Black

-.239* (.098)

-.199*

(.098)

-.267*

Hispanic

-.106

-.235*

(.110)

-.464*** (.119)

Female-headed Family .472*** (.065)

.492*** (.065)

.659*** (.098)

Male

.556*** (.055)

.421*** (.059)

.479*** (.083)

Urban

.277*** (.067)

.247** (.078)

.298**

-3.475*** (.051)

-3.759*** (.073)

Constant
Model F-Statistic

(.090)

30.97***

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

20.55***

(.107)

-4.228*** (.074)
20.01***
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several years post-TANF. Still, it is evident that gender is a significant predictor of
youth’s violence risks and the most important overall predictor in the pre-TANF model.
Metropolitan status also emerged as a significant predictor of violence risks before and
after the implementation of TANF, with urban youth expectedly being slightly more
likely to experience violent victimization than non-urban youth. Relative to gender,
however, the coefficients for metropolitan status were weaker and hence, the odds ratios
smaller; for the pre-TANF, early post-TANF, and late post-TANF periods, the odds of
violence for urban youth were 1.32, 1.28, and 1.35 times larger than that of non-urban
youth, respectively. For both gender and metropolitan status, the respective relationships
to violence risks stand in direct opposition to the hypothesized pattern in the povertyviolence relationship; the coefficients weakened in the immediate wake of welfare reform
and strengthened thereafter, expectedly suggesting that the implementation of TANF did
not impact the consequences of gender and metropolitan status for youth’s violence risks.
The introduction of the demographic controls also influenced the impact of race
on violence risks; statistically nonsignificant in previous models, there is a significant
relationship between race and violence risks in the present. The sign and magnitude of
the coefficients suggests that non-Hispanic black youth are slightly less likely than
minority youth to be victims of violence and again, this likelihood appears to decrease
during the early post-reform period and increase thereafter. So while there is a significant
association between race and violence risks each period, it does not appear to be related
to the mandatory work requirements implemented by TANF. The early post-reform
Hispanic coefficient is also statistically significant net of poverty, family structure, and
demographic controls, with Hispanic youth being 1.26 times less likely to experience
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violence than non-Hispanic white youth; the late post-reform coefficient also increased
by roughly twenty-four percent and remained statistically significant.
The respective relationships between gender, metropolitan status, and violence
risks aside, of greater concern is the impact of these demographic controls on the
poverty-violence relationship before, immediately, and several years after the
implementation of TANF. The results show that the introduction of gender and
metropolitan status did not improve poverty’s ability to predict violence risks but instead
reduced coefficients by an additional thirty-nine (pre-TANF), five (early post-TANF),
and twenty-one (late post-TANF) percent from the previous model, remaining highly
statistically nonsignificant. Again, family structure emerged as a significant predictor of
violence risks net of gender and metropolitan status, and the most important overall
predictor for each of the post-TANF periods. The coefficients were altered by less than
five percent each period relative to the previous model, but remained statistically
significant at the α=.001 level.
According to these results, then, it appears that family structure is not only the
most important overall predictor of youth’s violence risks but the underlying mechanism
that accounts for the relationship between poverty and violence. In the full model, the
odds of violent victimization was 1.60 times greater for youth in female-headed vis-à-vis
married couple families, which increased by less than three percent to 1.64 during the
early post-reform period. However, the odds ratio increased to 1.93 during the late postTANF period, a six-fold increase of nearly eighteen percent. This pattern clearly reveals
that despite the introduction of the demographic controls, the consequences of femaleheaded families for youth’s violence risks still increased more substantially between the
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early and late post-TANF periods than the pre- and early post-TANF periods, although
they did not increase significantly across the three periods. However, this pattern also
suggests that the consequences are not related to the mandatory work requirements that
contributed to the post-reform growth in working poor families.
A Brief Note on Model Fit
To assess the closeness of a fitted logistic regression model to the observed data,
goodness-of-fit tests should be performed. Sensitive to the introduction of sampling
weights, however, traditional tests such as the Homer-Lemeshow and Pearson’s chisquare are inappropriate for use with surveys that employ complex sampling designs such
as the NCVS (Archer & Lemeshow, 2006). To overcome this problem, Archer and
Lemeshow (2006) developed a procedure in Stata to test goodness-of-fit in survey
weighted logistic regression analyses. The test produces an F-adjusted mean residual
statistic that estimates lack-of-fit rather than goodness-of-fit--a statistically nonsignificant
result indicating that lack-of-fit is not an issue. After fitting the full models for each
period, this procedure was used to assess lack-of-fit. The results reveal that lack-of-fit is
not a problem for the pre-TANF (F=1.538, p value=.133), early post-TANF (F=.208, p
value=.993), or late post-TANF (F=.958, p value=.475) period.
Summary
The primary objective of this chapter is to determine whether the mandatory work
requirements implemented by TANF impacted the consequences of poverty for youth’s
risk for violence over recent decades, which is presumed to be indicated by an immediate
exacerbation of consequences that is eventually allayed as working parents accumulate
the work experience and skills necessary to secure better paying jobs. The direct
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relationship between poverty and violence risks did indeed follow this pattern, but the
small changes in the odds ratio were inconsistent with a welfare reform effect.
Additionally, the poverty-violence relationship was fully mediated by family structure,
which in addition to serving as a key mediator, also emerged as the most important
overall predictor of youth’s violence risks in the full post-TANF models.
Though in line with macro-level findings that identify family structure as an
important contingency in the post-reform relationship between poverty and violence
trends, however, the pattern in its consequences for violence risks is inconsistent with
that of working poor family trends, which forms the basis of the micro-level hypothesis.
Hence, it is not likely that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare reform
contributed to the increasing consequences of youth’s living arrangements for their
violence risks. In addition to family structure, race, gender, and metropolitan status also
emerged as important predictors of violence risks in the full model, but failed to impact
the relationship between poverty and violence.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There has been a long tradition of criminological research on the relationship
between economic deprivation and crime, yet little attention has been paid to the effects
of macroeconomic conditions and social welfare policies on youth violence trends. The
present study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the impact of recent
changes in macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on youth violent
victimization trends. Equally important, this study also proposed to determine whether
the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence has changed over recent
decades and if welfare reform played a significant role in these changes.
Drawing from a study conducted by Messner, Raffalovich, and McMillan (2001)
that found an important association between child poverty and juvenile homicide arrest
trends for both black and white youth, this research supposes that the changes in
macroeconomic conditions and federal welfare policies that contributed to the child
poverty trends of the 1990s and early 2000s also contributed to other youth violence
trends, or in this case youth violent victimization. In addition to race, however, this study
also examined trends disaggregated by Hispanic origin, family structure, and other
demographics in an effort to understand how these relationships differ across various
youth sub-groups.
First, findings from the macro-level analysis confirm that there is a significant
overall association between poverty and violence trends not only for all youth, but for
non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and youth in married couple and femaleheaded families. The strength and significance of the relationship varied substantially
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across youth groups and economic periods, with the most important relationships being
found among female-headed families and the post-reform periods (i.e. early post-reform
and economic downturn), respectively. Overall, however, the poverty-violence
relationship tended to be strongest and most consistently significant for groups of youth
in female-headed families.
The fact that family structure is important to the poverty-violence relationship is
not surprising. More so than race and ethnicity, family structure is strongly related to
children’s poverty. While black and Hispanic children are a little more than two and onehalf times as likely as white children to be poor, youth in female-headed families are
more than four times as likely as youth in married couple families to experience poverty
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2010). Research has extensively documented the
detriments of growing up in poor, female-headed families, many of which place youth at
greater risk for a host of adverse economic and social outcomes--including greater
exposure to violence in the impoverished, high crime areas in which they are more likely
to reside.
Another key contingency in the poverty-violence relationship was ethnicity, or in
this case, Hispanic origin. Across the total sample and every sub-group of racial and
ethnic youth, a very clear pattern emerged: the overall relationship between poverty and
violence was not statistically significant for Hispanic youth. In fact, the only significant
finding was that of female poverty and violence trends, which was only moderately
associated and marginally significant. While the absence of significant findings does not
mean that poverty is not related to Hispanic violence trends, it does suggest that other
factors beyond the scope of this study may be involved. One omitted variable that may
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shed some light on the differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is immigration
status.
Immigrant families face a number of unique challenges that place them at
particularly high risk for poverty and other social disadvantages. Although immigrants
have high employment rates, for example, they are more likely than native-born workers
to be employed in low-skilled, low-wage jobs. However, they also have relatively less
access to public assistance and social service programs that may otherwise provide vital
supports to working poor families. In addition to economic barriers, immigrant children
also have less access to head start programs, health insurance, and other social services,
which places them at greater risk for a host of long-term social, academic, and physical
health challenges (National Center for Children in Poverty, no date), which in turn places
them at greater risk for violence. Because they comprise the vast majority of the poor in
both recent and established immigrant families, these disadvantages should have
particular significance for Hispanic youth (Wight, Thampi, & Chau, 2011), and more
specifically, Hispanic youth violence.
On the other hand, poor children in immigrant families also have certain
advantages over poor, native born children. The parents of poor children in both recent
and established immigrant families exhibit stronger attachment to the labor force than
those of poor, native born children and have higher marriage rates. In established
immigrant families, moreover, poor children are more likely to be residentially stable
than those in native born and recent immigrant families (Wight, Thampi, & Chau, 2011).
There are also important contextual differences in black and Hispanic poor communities,
the latter tending to have more racial and economic heterogeneity and greater proportions
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of two-parent families--all of which may serve as protective factors against negative
adolescent outcomes. Whether these factors counteracted the negative effects of poverty
on Hispanic youth violence is unknown, but it is important for future research to pursue
this line of inquiry. A great deal of our knowledge about the group differences in violent
crime is based on black-white comparisons, but with significant growth in the current and
projected Hispanic youth population, it is increasingly important for researchers to
consider the roles of ethnicity and immigration status on poverty, violence, and other
youth outcomes. This information will help practitioners to address the unique needs of
immigrant youth in violence prevention and other social intervention programs.
Another key factor that emerged in the significance of the poverty-violence
relationship was the poverty measure used in the analysis. While the overwhelming
majority of the total poverty-violence and group poverty-violence relationships were not
statistically significant, it was total youth poverty that tended to be more closely
associated with victimization trends both in terms of strength and statistical significance.
When disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and family structure, however, it was presumed
that violence trends would be more closely associated with group poverty rather than
total poverty, which represents a more global measure of youth economic deprivation.
While the present findings suggest that changes in global poverty have a more
significant impact on group violence trends than changes in that group’s own poverty
rate, it is also possible that more proximate measures are needed to reliably assess the
differences in the effects of national-level deprivation and that of youth’s immediate
environments on violent crime trends. For example, an analysis comparing changes in
neighborhood violence rates to those in national- and neighborhood-level poverty would
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prove informative. However, such an assessment was not possible in the present study
because the NCVS does not contain neighborhood-level variables. Future research is
needed to determine how differences in the measurement of poverty affect its impacts on
violence trends, not just in terms of its proximity to subjects but also in the use of other
alternative measures.
The significance of the overall poverty-violence relationship also varied across
demographic sub-groups. Although predominately statistically nonsignificant, there was
an important overall association between the total poverty and violence trends of male
and younger adolescent sub-groups in the non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black,
married couple and female-headed family categories. On the other end of the spectrum,
the only significant association found among the older adolescent sub-group was for
youth in female-headed families. The variability in these findings underscores the
complexity in the macro-level relationship between youth poverty and violent
victimization trends, which otherwise could not be determined without the level of
disaggregation employed in this study. So despite the long-standing tradition of research
on the poverty-violence relationship, similar analyses are needed to understand why and
how this relationship differs for various youth sub-groups.
More important than the association between poverty and violence trends is the
larger impact of macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies on this
relationship. Of particular concern in the present study was the impact of the economic
expansion, TANF implementation, and economic downturn on recent trends in youth
violent victimization. Prior research has offered little empirical support for a relationship
between economic growth and violent crime trends. However, the established association
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between child poverty and juvenile violence trends calls for another look at this
relationship. It is my argument that the complexities of the economy-crime relationship
may not be understood in terms of a direct association, but through some other process or
intervening mechanism--a contention that is supported by Rosenfeld’s (2009) findings
that economic conditions (as measured by the Index of Consumer Sentiment) indirectly
affect homicide rates via acquisitive crimes such as burglary, motor vehicle theft, and
robbery. Research reported by Arvanites and Defina (2006) also suggests that business
cycles are negatively associated with economically motivated violent crime via
reductions in criminal motivation. Despite this evidence, however, the processes and
mechanisms that link economic conditions to violent crime are largely unknown.
Presuming that the changes in macroeconomic conditions that influenced recent child
poverty trends also influenced trends in youth violent victimization, this study seeks to
contribute to the understanding of this complex relationship.
Mixed support was found for this hypothesis. For the total sample of youth and
the overwhelming majority of sub-groups, there was no relationship between
macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime trends. However, certain groups of
youth were significantly impacted. Findings suggest that the economic expansion was
associated with the violence declines of females and all youths in female-headed families
via total poverty as well as younger adolescents and non-urban youths in married couple
families via group poverty. On the other hand, the economic downturn attributed to the
violence trends of non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black males via both total and
group poverty, as well as the total sample of non-Hispanic blacks via total poverty trends.
In addition, the downturn influenced violence trends among males and non-urban youth
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in female-headed families through associations with group and total poverty,
respectively.
These findings make evident the intricacies in the relationship between
macroeconomic conditions and youth violent crime trends--intricacies that have not been
uncovered in previous analyses because researchers have failed to consider how shifts in
macroeconomic conditions impact violence among youth in various sub-groups. Take the
results from the economic expansion period, for example. If the analysis had been
conducted only on the total sample of youth, the significant relationships for certain
groups in married couple and female-headed families would have gone undetected.
Moreover, the fact that the expansion’s effect on violence was limited to certain groups
of youth in families while the downturn’s effect was limited largely to racial groups
would have also been overlooked, a fact that the macro-level findings cannot readily
explain.
It is possible that the anti-poverty measures targeted towards poor families in the
1990s also served to reduce violence among youth in female-headed families and certain
groups in married couple families. Although research has identified substantial
improvements in the 1990s job market as a significant contributor to the child poverty
reductions of that time (Nichols, 2006), mandatory work requirements and tax incentives
enacted by federal welfare reforms and EITC expansions also played an important role in
the increased work efforts of single mothers and low-income families. By increasing
work efforts among poor families, then, it is also plausible that these measures had some
indirect influence on youth violence reductions.
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Prior analyses have not addressed these potential relationships, partly because
data and methodological limitations have made it difficult to disentangle the effects of the
economic expansion, Earned Income Tax Credit, and welfare reform on the growth in
maternal employment, reductions in child poverty and welfare caseloads, and other
economic developments of the 1990s, which in turn have hampered research efforts to
determine the distinct impact of each factor on various aspects of family and child wellbeing. This limitation is particularly characteristic of welfare reform evaluations as states’
administrative data do not include direct indicators of family and child well-being,
changes in family living arrangements, and recipients’ access to other sources of nonpublic support (Acs and Loprest, 2007). Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence that
expansions to the Earned Income Tax Credit contributed to a significant portion of the
increase in maternal employment between 1984 and 1996 while smaller contributions
were made by welfare experimentation programs and other work incentive initiatives
(e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2006), which included mandatory participation in welfareto-work programs, temporary time limits, and child-care for working mothers. However,
this work pre-dates the implementation of the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
program.
While the inability to resolve these issues is an obvious limitation of this research,
the findings will hopefully illustrate the importance of ‘thinking outside of the box’ when
it comes to the study of the economy-violent crime relationship. Doing so will allow
researchers to shed new light on the effects of long-studied indicators such as
unemployment on violent crime rates; while there is a close, historical association
between adult unemployment and child poverty rates, researchers have failed to consider
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whether long-term changes in adult unemployment have impacted youth violence trends
through this association. A more creative approach would also lend itself to the study of
the relationship between violent crime and other less common, but equally relevant,
indicators of economic growth--the importance of which is illustrated by the previously
noted findings of Arvanites and Defina (2006), Rosenfeld (2009), and more recent
research conducted by Lauritsen and Heimer (2010) which provides evidence of an
association between long-term changes in consumer pessimism and serious violent
victimization among black and Latino males.
As mentioned in the preceding discussion, the economic downturn appeared to
have a particularly significant impact on the violence trends of non-Hispanic white and
non-Hispanic black males, which followed very similar patterns between 2001 and 2004.
Past research has established that minorities tend to suffer greater economic
consequences than whites during periods of recession, primarily because they are more
likely to be employed in the low-skilled, low wage jobs that are disproportionately
affected by downturns in the economy--a pattern that is observed not only in employment
but child poverty trends as well. Given the inter-relationships between economic growth,
child poverty, and youth violence, it was expected that minorities would also experience
the most significant growth in violence rates during the weakened economic state of the
early 2000s. While rates expectedly increased for white and black males (as well as the
total sample of white and black youth), however, there was a sharp drop in Hispanic
victimization after 2002. Thus, the downturn-era trends in violent victimization were
more similar for white and black youth than black and Hispanic youth, which is
inconsistent with expected findings.
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One potential explanation for this inconsistency is that the 2001 recession affected
workers of all racial, family, and earnings groups and unlike past recessions, did not
impact minorities more significantly than whites. Other research has suggested that
modern recessions like that observed in 2001 also differ from past recessions in that
unemployment rises because of the difficulty finding new jobs rather than the loss of jobs
(e.g. Hall, 2007), although the recent downturn challenges this notion. Indeed, the growth
in unemployment between 2001 and 2004 was modest and although the increase in black
child poverty was more than three times larger than that of white children, neither
experienced substantial increases; rates increased by one percentage point for white
children, three and one-half points for black children, and less than one percentage point
for Hispanic children.
Thus, the nature of the 2001 recession was not one that lent itself to
disproportionate consequences for minority youth, neither in terms of poverty nor
violence trends, so it makes sense that downturn-era trends in violent victimization were
similar for white and black youth. However, longer time series should be examined to
determine whether these findings also apply to past recessions or indeed reflect the nature
of the 2001 downturn. Because this study is based on one expansion and recession period,
results cannot be generalized to other periods of economic growth.
An additional disadvantage of analyzing a relatively short time series is that the
economic downturn and early post-reform periods both contain only four data points,
which makes a strong association between trends more likely. The overall relationship
between total poverty and violent victimization exhibits this tendency, with correlations
approaching 1.00 for the early post-reform and economic downturn periods. Excluding
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Hispanic groups, moreover, a large portion of the sub-group relationships also follow this
pattern. However, there is enough variation in the strength of these relationships to
conclude that inflated correlations are not inherent to the shorter time periods. The same
general pattern was observed for the group poverty-violence results, but the relationships
were substantially weaker than those observed for total poverty-violence. Still, these
findings should be interpreted with caution as reliability issues with the shorter time
periods weaken any conclusions that may be drawn about the effects of welfare reform
and the economic downturn on youth violence trends.
With this caveat in mind, the association between poverty and violence trends was
also assessed during the early post-reform period in an attempt to uncover the larger
influence of TANF on the relationship. Prior research has examined the effects of
PRWORA and other welfare reforms on maternal employment and family income,
welfare caseloads, marriage and children’s living arrangements, and family and child
well-being, but criminologists have largely ignored the potential impacts of welfare
reform for youth violence trends. While there is evidence of a cross-national relationship
between welfare spending levels and child homicide rates (e.g. Briggs & Cutright, 1994),
the national-level relationship between welfare reform and trends in youth violent
victimization has not been assessed. While this omission is due partly to a lack of
relevant data, existing data sources such as the NCVS provide an opportunity to examine
this relationship via the association between poverty and victimization trends.
In the wake of welfare reform, there was a marked acceleration in child poverty
declines for all children, but most substantially for Hispanics and those in female-headed
families. I argue that similar patterns in victimization trends would reflect the influence
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of welfare reform. For urban minorities and Hispanic females, victimization trends did
display a marked acceleration during the early post-reform period. However, the pattern
in the group victimization reductions was inconsistent with a welfare reform effect. For
the majority of black youth sub-groups and in particular females, older adolescents, and
non-urban youth, there was a spike in victimization that coincided roughly with the
implementation of TANF, indicating that welfare reform may have had a shock effect on
these groups. Because poverty declined for all black sub-groups during the early postreform period, however, any adverse effects that welfare reform might have had on black
victimization rates would have come through some other mechanism beyond the scope of
this study. In terms of the present hypotheses, it does not appear that welfare reform
contributed to victimization reductions for either non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic
black, or Hispanic youth.
Victimization trends disaggregated by family structure exhibited more prominent
early post-reform reductions, but while rates fell more uniformly for groups in married
couple families, they declined markedly for the majority of groups in female-headed
families. Occurring in 1998 for all sub-groups in female-headed families, this marked
decline was most apparent for males, younger adolescents, and urban youth, which
suggests that any effects of welfare reform were most likely not immediate. These
effects, according to the findings, came through an association with total poverty for nonurban and all youth in married couple families and males, females, urban, and all youth in
female-headed families. Through its association with group poverty, moreover, welfare
reform also contributed to male victimization in female-headed families. More than any
other group examined, therefore, welfare reform appears to have impacted youth violent
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victimization in female-headed families, which is consistent with the fact that welfare is
almost exclusively targeted towards single mothers with children. However, additional
analyses also confirmed that relative to the pre-reform period, the post-reform association
between youth poverty and violence trends was also more statistically important for nonHispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks.
The potential criminogenic effects of welfare reform were also explored by
examining the changes in the relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence
before and after TANF implementation. Drawing on trends in working poor families and
the consequences of these trends for poor adolescents, I argue that if TANF had any
influence on the relationship, the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence risks
would be exacerbated as the proportion of poor children in low-income working families
increased (i.e. early post-reform period). As the proportion of poor children in lowincome families decreased, however, the consequences of poverty for youth’s violence
risks would also diminish over time (i.e. late post-reform period). This pattern partially is
in line with findings that children in working poor families, who fared just as bad
children in non-working poor families at the time of TANF implementation, tended to
fare significantly better seven years later (see Wertheimer, Moore, and Burkhauser,
2008), which suggests that the increased work efforts associated with welfare reform
have longer term benefits for affected youth.
Across the pre-reform, early post-reform, and late post-reform periods, the direct
relationship between poverty and youth’s violence risks did follow the hypothesized
pattern, seeming to suggest that the mandatory work requirements enacted by welfare
reform did influence violence risks. However, the fact that poverty’s consequences for
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violence risks varied only slightly across the three periods suggests that welfare reform
most likely failed to influence the relationship. Still, examining the influence of race,
ethnicity, family structure, and other demographic controls on the poverty-violence
relationship was another objective of the micro-level analysis. Findings from the full
model identify race, family structure, gender, and metropolitan status as significant
predictors of violence risks, with non-Hispanic white, female-headed family, male, and
urban youth being slightly more likely than their counterparts to experience violent
victimization. However, the relationship between poverty and violence risks was not only
fully mediated by family structure, but it also emerged as the most important overall
predictor of violence risks in the early and late post-reform models.
The findings for family structure were consistent with macro-level results
identifying family structure, and especially female-headed families, as an important
contingency in the relationship between total youth poverty and violence trends,
particularly during the early post-reform period. And although the consequences of
family structure for violence risks increased more substantially between the early and late
post-reform periods than the pre- and early post-reform periods, the changes did not
appear to be associated with the mandatory work requirements enacted by TANF--at least
in a manner consistent with the presumed relationships between mandatory work
requirements, working poor family trends, and the implied consequence for poor youth.
Given the pattern in the relationship, however, it is possible that some other aspect of
welfare reform may have exacerbated the consequences of family structure for violence
risks, perhaps even aggravating already increasing consequences. However, a longer
time series would have to be analyzed to confirm this speculation.
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One consequence of welfare reform with potential impacts for female-headed
families is the increased rules and stricter eligibility requirements that often discourage
TANF participation. Evidence from the National Survey of American Families suggests
that between 1997 and 2002, there was a considerable decline and concurrent increase in
the proportion of ‘leavers’ exiting welfare for employment and other reasons such as not
wanting or needing benefits or too much hassle involved with receipt (Loprest and
Zedlewski, 2006). Data from states’ administrative records also show that rule-related
reasons for welfare desistance far outweigh employment.
During the 2003 fiscal year, for example, more than forty percent of cases were
closed due to federal time limits, sanctions, state policies, or failure to cooperate with
eligibility requirements while another fourteen percent were voluntary closures. In
comparison, employment accounted for only eighteen percent of closures (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2006). It is important to note that the
estimates for employment closures in the administrative data are substantially smaller
than those derived from empirical data, primarily because employment is often coded as a
failure to cooperate or other reason due to non-reporting. Regardless of the data source,
however, evidence suggests that the stricter rules enacted by welfare reform resulted in
the closure of a substantial proportion of cases and according to the evidence from the
NSAF, the proportion of these cases has increased over time. One of the obvious
implications of these findings is that otherwise eligible families are being excluded from
the TANF program and no doubt, these families include a significant proportion of
female-headed families.
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Again, this line of reasoning is only speculative. This study offers no definitive
evidence that TANF program restrictions contributed to the increasing consequences of
family structure for violence risks, or whether TANF contributed at all. The inability to
draw a sound conclusion about the effects of welfare reform is due largely to the absence
of direct measures of specific welfare policies, which along with the reliability of the
early post-reform and economic downturn correlations and the inability to distinguish the
effects of the economic expansion from other economic and policy developments of the
1990s, is a major limitation of the current study. In addition to inhibiting the ability to
draw sound conclusions, this absence also prevents the identification of the specific
provisions that may deter eligible families from participating in TANF or otherwise
contribute to negative family and child outcomes (i.e. mandatory work requirements, time
limits, threat/use of sanctions for noncompliance, etc.). While the observed patterns offer
some clue of how the poverty-violence relationship changed before and after welfare
reform, the findings are largely descriptive. More research is needed to determine
whether these patterns indeed reflect the influence of welfare reform or the unique
intersection of the macroeconomic and welfare policy changes of the 1990s and early
2000s.
Despite these limitations, this study offers promising directions for future
research. National-level studies on the long-term effects of welfare reform are scant (Acs
and Nelson, 2007), and virtually non-existent are studies examining the long-term effects
of welfare reform on youth violence trends, as previously mentioned. Because welfare
and other public assistance programs play an integral role in the economic and material
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well-being of poor children, it is likely that large-scale changes in social welfare policy
have had indirect influences on youth violence through child poverty trends.
This omission from the analyses of youth violent crime trends paints an
incomplete picture of public policy’s role in these changes, and more generally, the
potential criminal justice impacts of social policies targeted toward the alleviation of
child poverty, or by the same token, those that inadvertently contribute to increased
deprivation--particularly among disadvantaged groups such as poor children and femaleheaded families. This area of research would yield valuable information that would help
policymakers to anticipate the unintended benefits and consequences of anti-poverty or
other social policies for criminal justice outcomes, and allocate funds and resources to
achieve the best outcomes for youth.
Though not definitive, the sum of the evidence suggests that macroeconomic and
social policy changes do indeed have the potential to influence violent victimization
trends, particularly among youth in female-headed families. In addition, changes in
federal welfare policy appeared to impact the direct relationship between poverty and
youth’s risk for violence over recent decades, but family structure fully mediated this
relationship both before and after the implementation of TANF. While highlighting the
significance of family structure for the poverty-violence relationship, this research has
also identified some of the specific challenges associated with the study of the economyyouth violence relationship. By addressing these challenges, future research may shed
significant light on the relationship between recent economic and policy developments
and youth violence trends. More specifically, some of the important lessons learned for
future research include:
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In addition to macroeconomic conditions and welfare reform policies, tax
incentives such as the EITC also have important implications for recent
youth violence trends. Although the economic expansion and associated
improvements in the job market contributed substantially to child poverty
reductions in the 1990s, some research attributes as much as one-fifth and
one-third of the early ‘90s increase in maternal employment to welfare reform
and the EITC, respectively (e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). Given the
obvious implications of these findings for child poverty reductions, it is important
for researchers to consider the role that the EITC may have played in recent youth
violence trends; with continued expansions to the EITC, including the availability
of local credits in New York City, the District of Columbia, and twenty-two states
including Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey (Internal Revenue Service, 2011), it
is particularly important for researchers to consider how its targeted support of
vulnerable groups such as low-income, female-headed families may inadvertently
influence criminal justice outcomes.

To accurately assess how year-to-year changes in one variable affect year-to
year changes in another, longer time series should be analyzed. As evidenced
by the findings for the poverty-violence associations of the early post-reform and
economic downturn periods, a small number of data points may artificially inflate
estimates of the association between two trends. To produce more reliable
estimates in trend analyses, particularly when distinct eras or conditions are of
interest, series covering several decades of data are ideal. While this study
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is concerned with the impact of recent macroeconomic and social policy changes
on youth violence trends, extending the analysis will allow researchers to
determine the extent that the present findings apply to other economic and policy
contexts.

The strength and significance of the poverty-violence relationship is contingent
upon several factors, including the measurement of poverty. This study used a
variation of the official definition of poverty to estimate both total and groupspecific poverty rates for various groups of youth, and results from the macrolevel analysis clearly suggests that the total poverty-violence association is more
statistically important than that of group poverty and violence. Whether this
pattern represents a true difference in the nature of the relationship between
poverty and violence trends or some artifact of the poverty measure is unknown,
but experimentation with alternative poverty measures may provide some clue.
Additionally, alternative measures may make some difference in the micro-level
relationship between poverty and youth’s risks for violence, which appeared to be
fairly weak in the present study.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.162
References
Acs, Gregory and Pamela Loprest (2007). TANF Caseload Composition and Leavers
Synthesis Final Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research,
and Evaluation.
Agnew, Robert (1986). Work and Delinquency Among Juveniles Attending School.
Journal of Crime and Justice 9: 19-41.
(1990). Adolescent Resources and Delinquency. Criminology 28: 535-566.
Allison, Paul D. (1999). Logistic Regression Analysis Using the SAS System: Theory
and Application. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc.
Anderson, Elijah (1999). Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of
the Inner City. New York: W. W. Norton.
Archer, Kellie J. and Stanley Lemeshow (2006). Goodness-of-Fit Test for a Logistic
Regression Model Fitted Using Survey Sample Data. The Stata Journal 6:
97-105.
Balkwell, James W. (1990). Ethnic Inequality and the Rate of Homicide. Social Forces
69: 53-70.
Barnes, Grace M., Joseph H. Hoffman, John W. Welte, Michael P. Farrell, Barbara A.
Dintcheff (2006). Effects of Parental Monitoring and Peer Deviance on Substance
Use and Delinquency. Journal of Marriage and Family 68: 1084-1104.
Bernard, Susan M. and Michael A. McGeehin (2003). Prevalence of Blood Lead Levels
≥5 μg/dL Among U.S. Children 1 to 5 Years of Age and Socioeconomic and
Demographic Factors Associated with Blood of Lead Levels 5 to 10 μg/dL, Third

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.163
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1988-1994. Pediatrics 112:
1308-1313.
Blank, Rebecca M., David Card, Frank Levy, and James L. Medoff (1993). Poverty,
Income Distribution, and Growth: Are They Still Connected? Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity 1993: 285-339
Blau, Judith R., and Peter M. Blau (1982). The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan
Structure and Violent Crime. American Sociological Review 47: 114-129.
Bradley, Robert H., Robert F. Corwyn, Harriet P. McAdoo, and Cynthia G. Coll (2001).
The Home Environments of Children in the United States Part I: Variations by
Age, Ethnicity, and Poverty Status. Child Development 72(6): 1844-1867.
Braithwaite, John (1981). The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered.
American Sociological Review 46: 36-57.
Bureau of Justice Statistics (no date). National Crime Victimization Survey. Retrieved
from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245.
Bursik, Robert J. and Harold G. Grasmick (1993). Economic Deprivation and
Neighborhood Crime Rates, 1960-1980. Law & Society Review 27:263-283.
Butts, Jeffrey and Jeremy Travis (2002). The Rise and Fall of American Youth Violence:
1980 to 2000. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
Cantor, David and Kenneth C. Land (1985). Unemployment and Crime Rates in the
Post-World War II United States: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.
American Sociological Review 50: 317-332.
Center for Educational Policy (2009). State High School Exit Exams: Trends in Test
Programs, Alternative Pathways, and Pass Rates. Washington, DC: Authors.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.164
Chen, Xiao, Philip B. Ender, Michael Mitchell, and Christine Wells (2003). Regression
with Stata. Retrieved from
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/default.htm.
Cloward, Richard A. and Lloyd E. Ohlin (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity: A
Theory of Delinquent Gangs. New York: Free Press.
Cohen, Albert K. (1955). Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: Free
Press.
Cullen, Francis T., Martha Todd Larson, and Richard A. Mathers (1985). Having Money
and Delinquent Involvement: The Neglect of Power in Delinquency Theory.
Criminal Justice and Behavior 12: 171-192.
Currie, Elliott (1998). Crime and Punishment in America. New York: Metropolitan
Books.
Cutler, David M., Lawrence F. Katz, David Card, and Robert E. Hall (1991).
Macroeconomic Performance and the Disadvantaged. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 1991: 1-74.
De Coster, Stacy, Karen Heimer, and Stacy M. Wittrock (2006). Neighborhood
Disadvantage, Social Capital, Street Context, and Youth Violence. The
Sociological Quarterly 47:723-753.
De-Navas-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith (2008). Income,
Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008. Current
Population Reports, P60-236. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.165
(2010). Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:
2009. Current Population Reports, P60-238. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Donohue, John J., and Steven D. Levitt (2001). The Impact of Legalized Abortion on
Crime. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 379-420.
Drake, Brett and Mark R. Rank (2009). The Racial Divide Among American Children in
Poverty: Reassessing the Importance of Neighborhood. Children and Youth
Services Review 31: 1264-1271.
Evans, Gary (2004). The Environment of Childhood Poverty. American Psychologist 59:
77-92.
Feld, Barry C. (1998). Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth
Violence. Crime and Justice 24: 189-261.
Fisher, Gordon M. (1992). The Development and History of the Poverty Thresholds.
Social Security Bulletin 55(4): 3-15.
Freeman, Richard B. (2001). The Rising Tide Lifts…? National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 8155. Retrieved from:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8155.
Freeman, Richard B., and William M. Rodgers III (1999). Area Economic Conditions
and Labor Market Outcomes of Young Men in the 1990s Expansion. National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7073. Retrieved from:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7073.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.166
Gould, Eric D., Bruce A. Weinberg and David B. Mustard (2002). Crime Rates and
Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States, 1979-1997. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 84: 45-61.
Gunderson, Craig and James P. Ziliak (2004). Poverty and Macroeconomic Performance
across Space, Race, and Family Structure. Demography 41: 61-86.
Hall, Robert E. (2007). How Much Do We Understand About the Modern Recession?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2007(2): 13-28.
Grant, Kathryn E., Bruce E. Compas, Alice F. Stuhlmacher, Audrey E. Thurm, Susan D.
McMahon, and Janice A. Halpert (2003). Stressors and Child and Adolescent
Psychopathology: Moving from Markers to Mechanisms of Risk. Psychological
Bulletin 129: 447-466.
Harer, Miles D., and Darrell Steffensmeier (1992). The Differing Effects of Economic
Inequality on Black and White Rates of Violence. Social Forces 70: 1035-1054.
Haveman, Robert and Johnathan Schwabish (1999). Macroeconomic Performance and
the Poverty Rate: A Return to Normalcy. University of Wisconsin Institute for
Research on Poverty Discussion Paper, DP 1187-99.
Hay, Carter (2001). Parenting, Self-Control, and Delinquency: A Test of Self-Control
Theory. Criminology 39: 707-736.
Heimer, Karen (1995). Gender, Race, and the Pathways to Delinquency: An Interactionist
Explanation. In John Hagan and Ruth D. Peterson (Eds.), Crime and Inequality
(pp. 140-173). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Herrenkohl, Todd L., Eugene Maguin, Karl G. Hill, J. David Hawkins, Robert D. Abbott,
and Richard F. Catalano (2002). Developmental Risk Factors for Youth Violence.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.167
Journal of Adolescent Health 26: 176-186.
Hipp, John R. (2007). Income Inequality, Race, and Place: Does the Distribution of Race
and Class Within Neighborhoods Affect Crime Rates? Criminology 45:665-697.
Hirschi, Travis (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hoynes, Hilary W., Marianne E. Page, and Ann Huff Stevens (2006). Poverty in
America: Trends and Explanations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 47-68.
Iceland, John, Kathleen Short, Thesia I. Gardner, and David Johnson (2001). Are
Children Worse Off?: Evaluating Well-Being Using a New (and Improved)
Measure of Poverty. The Journal of Human Resources 36: 398-412.
Internal Revenue Service (2011). EITC Home Page. Retrieved from:
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html.
Jargowsky, Paul A. (2003). Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline
of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
Kelly, Morgan (2000). Inequality and Crime. The Review of Economics and Statistics 82:
530-539.
Kovandzic, Tomislav V., Lynn M. Vieraitis and Mark R. Yeisley (1998). The Structural
Covariates of Urban Homicide: Reassessing the Impact of Income Inequality and
Poverty in the Post-Reagan Era. Criminology 36: 569-600.
Krivo, Lauren J. and Ruth D. Peterson (2004). Labor Market Conditions and Violent
Crime Among Youth and Adults. Sociological Perspectives 47: 485-505.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.168
LaFree, Gary and Kriss A. Drass (1999). The Effect of Changes in Intraracial Income
Inequality and Educational Attainment on Changes in Arrest Rates for African
Americans and Whites, 1957 to 1990. American Sociological Review 61:
614-634.
LaFree, Gary, Kriss A. Drass, and Patrick O’Day (1992). Race and Crime in Postwar
America: Determinants of African-American and White Rates, 1957-1988.
Criminology 30: 157-188.
Land, Kenneth C., Patricia L. McCall and Lawrence E. Cohen (1990). Structural
Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Invariances Across Time and Social
Space? The American Journal of Sociology 95: 922-963.
Langdon, David S., Terence M. McMenamin and Thomas J. Krolik (2002). U.S. Labor
Market in 2001: Economic Enters a Recession. Monthly Labor Review 125: 3-33.
Lauritsen, Janet L. (2003). How Families and Communities Influence Youth
Victimization. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. NCJ 210629.
Lauritsen, Janet L. and Karen Heimer (2010). Violent Victimization Among
Males and Economic Conditions: The Vulnerability of Race and Ethnic
Minorities. Criminology & Public Policy, 9: 665-692.
Leahy, Robert L. (1983). Development of the Conception of Economic Inequality: II.
Explanations, Justifications, and Concepts of Social Mobility and Change.
Developmental Psychology 19:111-125.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.169
Lee, Matthew R., Michael O. Maume and Graham C. Ousey (2003). Social isolation and
lethal violence across the metro/non-metro divide: The effects of socioeconomic
disadvantage and poverty concentration on homicide. Rural Sociology: 68(1),
107-131.
Leiber, Michael J., Kristin Y. Mack and Richard A. Featherstone (2009). Family
Structure, Family Processes, Economic Factors, and Delinquency: Similarities
and Differences by Race and Ethnicity. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 7:
79-99.
Levitt, Steven D. and Lance Lochner (2001). The Determinants of Juvenile Crime. In
Jonathan Gruber (Ed.), Risky Behavior Among Youths: An Economic Analysis
(pp. 327-374). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lichter, Daniel T., Zhenchao Qian, and Martha L. Crowley (2005). Child Poverty Among
Racial Minorities and Immigrants: Explaining Trends and Differentials. Social
Science Quarterly 86: 1037-1059.
Lipsey, Michael W. and James H. Derzon (1998). Predictors of Serious Delinquency in
Adolescence and Early Adulthood. In Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington
(Eds.), Serious and Violent Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions
(pp. 86-105). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Loeber, Rolf and Magda Stouthamer-Loeber (1986). Family Factors as Correlates and
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency. Crime and Justice
7: 29-149.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.170
Loprest, Pamela and Sheila Zedlewski (2006). The Changing Role of Welfare in the
Lives of Low-Income Families with Children. Assessing the New Federalism
Occasional Paper 73. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
MacDonald, John M. and Angela R. Gover (2005). Concentrated Disadvantage and
Youth-On-Youth Homicide: Assessing the Structural Covariates Over Time.
Homicide Studies 9: 30-54.
McLoyd, Vonnie C. (1998). Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development.
American Psychologist 53: 185-204.
McNulty, Thomas L. and Paul E. Bellair (2003). Explaining Racial Ethnic Differences in
Serious Adolescent Violent Behavior. Criminology 41: 709-748.
Messner, Steven F., Lawrence E. Raffalovich, and Richard McMillan (2001). Economic
Deprivation and Changes in Homicide Arrest Rates for White and Black Youths,
1967-1998: A National Time-Series Analysis. Criminology 39: 591-614.
Messner, Steven F. and Reid M. Golden (1992). Racial Inequality and Racially
Disaggregated Homicide Rates: An Assessment of Alternative Theoretical
Explanations. Criminology 30: 421-447.
Messner, Steven F. and Scott South (1986). Economic Deprivation, Opportunity
Structure, and Robbery Victimization: Intra- and Interracial Patterns. Social
Forces 64:975-991.
Mitchell, Kimberly J. and David Finkelhor (2001). Risk of Crime Victimization Among
Youth Exposed to Domestic Violence. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 16:
944-964.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.171
Moore, Kristin Anderson and Martha J. Zaslow (2002). The Unfinished Business of
Welfare Reform: Improving Prospects for Poor Children and Youth. Retrieved
from: http://www.childtrends.org/files/UnfinishedBusinessofWR.pdf.
Morisi, Teresa L. (2008). Youth Enrollment and Employment During the School Year.
Monthly Labor Review 131: 51-63.
National Center for Children in Poverty (no date). Immigrant Families. Retrieved from:
http://www.nccp.org/topics/immigrantfamilies.html.
National Center for Education Statistics (no date). Enrollment Rates of 18- to 24-YearOlds in Degree-Granting Institutions, by Type of Institution and Sex and Race/
Ethnicity of Student: 1967 through 2007. Retrieved from:
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_204.asp.
Needleman, Herbert, Julie Riess, Michael Tobin, Gretchen Biesecker, and Joel
Greenhouse (1996). Bone Lead Levels and Delinquent Behavior. Journal of
American Medical Association 275: 363-369.
Nichols, Austin (2006). Understanding Changes in Child Poverty Over the Past
Decade. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Assessing the New Federalism
Discussion Paper 06-02.
Parker, Karen F. and Amy Reckdenwald (2008). Concentrated Disadvantage, Traditional
Male Role Models, and African-American Juvenile Violence. Criminology 46:
711-735.
Parker, Karen F. and Patricia McCall (1999). Structural Conditions and Racial Homicide
Patterns: A Look at the Multiple Disadvantages in Urban Areas. Criminology 37:
447-478.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.172

Paternoster, Raymond, Shawn Bushway, Robert Brame, and Robert Apel (2003). The
Effect of Teenage Employment on Delinquency and Problem Behaviors. Social
Forces 82: 297-335.
Patterson, Britt E. (1991). Poverty, Income Inequality, and Community Crime Rates.
Criminology 29:755-776.
Raphael, Steven and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2001). Identifying the Effect of
Unemployment on Crime. Journal of Law and Economics 44: 259-283.
Resnick, Michael A., Marjorie Ireland and Iris Borowsky (2004). Youth Violence
Perpetration: What Protects? What Predicts? Findings from the National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. Journal of Adolescent Health 35:
424.e1-424.e10.
Rosenfeld, Richard (2009). Crime is the Problem: Homicide, Acquisitive Crime, and
Economic Conditions. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 25: 287-306.
Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub (1993). Crime in the Making: Pathways and
Turning Points through Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub (1994). Urban Poverty and the Family Context of
Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Process in a Classic Study. Child
Development 65: 523-540.
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush and Felton Earls (1997). Neighborhoods
and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy. Science
277: 918-924.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.173
Shields, Margie K. and Richard E. Behrman (2002). Children and Welfare Reform:
Analysis and Recommendations. The Future of Children 12: 4-25.
Shihadeh, Edward S. and Darrel J. Steffensmeier (1994). Economic Inequality, Family
Disruption, and Urban Black Violence: Cities as Unites of Stratification and
Social Control. Social Forces 73:729-751.
Short, Kathleen, Thesia I. Garner, David Johnson, and Patricia Doyle (1999).
Experimental Poverty Measures: 1990 to 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population Reports, Consumer Income, P60-205). Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Steinberg, Laurence (1996). Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed and
What Parents Need To Do. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Stewart, Eric A. and Ronald L. Simons (2006). Structure and Culture in African
American Adolescent Violence: A Partial Test of the “Code of the Street” Thesis.
Justice Quarterly 23: 1-33.
Stolzenberg, Lisa, David Eitle and Stewart J. D’Alession (2006). Race, Economic
Inequality, and Violent Crime. Journal of Criminal Justice 34: 303-316.
Santiago, Catherine DeCarlo and Martha E. Wadsworth (2009). Coping with Family
Conflict: What’s Helpful and What’s Not for Low-Income Adolescents.
Journal of Child and Family Studies 18: 192-202.
Thornberry, Terence P. (1987). Toward and Interactional Theory of Delinquency.
Criminology 25:863-891.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.174
Tittle, Charles R., Wayne J. Villemez, and Douglas R. Smith (1978). The Myth of Social
Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence.
American Sociological Review 43: 643-656.
Travis, Jeremy and Michelle Waul (2002). Reflections on the Crime Decline: Lessons for
the Future? Proceedings from the Urban Institute Crime Decline Forum.
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
U.S. Census Bureau (no date). Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old:
1960 to Present. Retrieved from:
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html#history.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, Office of Family Assistance (2006). TANF Seventh Annual Report to
Congress.
Wadsworth, Martha E. and Bruce E. Compas (200). Coping with Family Conflict and
Economic Strain: The Adolescent Perspective. Journal of Research on
Adolescence 12: 243-274.
Warren, John Robert, Paul C. LePore, and Robert D. Mare (2000). Employment During
High School: Consequences for Students’ Grades in Academic Courses. American
Educational Research Journal 37: 943-969.
Wertheimer, Richard, Kristin Anderson Moore, and Mary Burkhauser (2008). The
Well-Being of Children in Working Poor Families: 1997 and 2004. Child Trends
Research Brief 2008-33.
Wight, Vanessa R., Kalyani Thampi, and Michelle Chau (2011). Poor Children by
Parents’ Nativity: What Do We Know? National Center for Children in

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.175
Poverty Research Brief.
Williams, Kirk R. (1984). Economic Sources of Homicide: Reestimating the Effects of
Poverty and Inequality. American Sociological Review 49: 283-289.
Wright, John Paul, Francis T. Cullen and Nicole Williams (1997). Working While in
School and Delinquent Involvement: Implications for Social Policy. Crime and
Delinquency 43: 203-222.

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.176

APPENDICES

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.177
Appendix A
Comparison of NCVS and CPS National Youth Poverty Estimates, 1993-2004
50.0

45.0

40.0

35.0

CPS (0-18)
25.0

20.0
NCVS (12-17)
15.0

10.0

5.0

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

0.0

1993

% Below Poverty

30.0

White, Nicole, 2011, UMSL, p.178
Appendix B
Comparison of Children’s Living Arrangements in the NCVS and CPS
Married Couple Families
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Appendix B (cont’d)
Female-headed Families
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Appendix C
Male Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix C (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix D
Female Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix D (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix E
12 to 14 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix E (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix F
15 to 17 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix F (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix G
Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix G (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix H
Non-Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2004
By total poverty rates
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Appendix H (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix I
Male Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix I (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix J
Female Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix J (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix K
12 to 14 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix K (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix L
15 to 17 Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix L (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix M
Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix M (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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Appendix N
Non-Urban Youth Poverty and Violent Victimization Rates by Family Structure, 1993-2004
By Total Poverty Rates
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Appendix N (cont’d)
By Group Poverty Rates
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